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This essay is about the language used to decide when governments
should be held responsible for constitutional torts.' Debate about what
is required of government officials, and what is required of government
itself, is scarcely new. What is new, at least to American jurispru-
dence, is litigation against government units (rather than government
officials) for constitutional injuries. 2 The extension of liability to insti-
tutional defendants introduces special problems for the language of
responsibility. In a suit against an individual official it is easy to de-
scribe the wrong as the consequence of individual behavior that is in-
consistent with community norms; the language of common-law tort,
which refers explicitly to those norms, has seemed to provide a useful
starting point for evaluating that behavior.3 When the defendant is an
institution, the language of tort provides no such ground because tra-
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1968, M.A. 1970, J.D. 1974, University of
Michigan. - Ed.
1. The cases that I will be discussing are, for the most part, brought against local govern-
ments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Similar questions arise in suits against state officials in their official capacity under section 1983
or Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
2. Absent consent to suit, the federal and state governments have been immune from suits
based on wrongs other than the taking of property for public purposes. Although federal officials
may be sued for constitutional torts since the decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the federal government itself is liable only
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80, which refers to the law of the
state in which the tort occurred rather than to federal constitutional law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution protects state governments from suits
in federal courts for damages or other retrospective relief. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); see also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). And the
Supreme Court has held that section 1983 was not intended by Congress to waive this immunity.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Cities and counties could not be made defendants in
section 1983 actions until Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), overruled
that portion of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), which held that municipalities are not
"persons" within the meaning of the statute.
3. The most commonly cited indication of this tendency is Justice Douglas' statement, in the
opening effort to define the scope of individual liability under section 1983: The statute "should
be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural
consequences of his actions." Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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ditionally it has not been used to evaluate harms created by structures
and contexts rather than by individuals. When discussions of institu-
tional responsibility are couched only in terms borrowed from tort
they are impoverished. The poverty of discussions cast in tort vocabu-
lary can even be read to suggest that we simply have no norms for
risk-creating behavior other than those applied to individuals.
I begin with a discussion of the language of responsibility as it has
been developed in tort for tracing the consequences of individual be-
havior. Suits against institutions have been assimilated to this lan-
guage through the doctrines of vicarious and strict liability. In
constitutional tort litigation, however, these doctrines are not avail-
able, and the problem of institutional responsibility must be faced
directly.
I then discuss a series of constitutional tort cases - those cases in
which the Supreme Court has elaborated the conditions under which
government liability will be imposed - in order to investigate this
problem of language. In these cases the perspective adopted from tort
encourages the Justices to convert the problem of institutional moral-
ity into one of individual morality; tort language leads them to look
for individual choices and motives, for an actor or a "mind" that can
be evaluated. In most of these cases the possibility of looking at an
institution as a unit distinct from the separate individuals who com-
pose it is not considered. For example, the Justices fail to see that
injuries can be brought about quite inadvertently through the work-
ings of institutional structures - through the massing or fragmenta-
tion of authority, or by the creation of a culture in which responses
and a sense of responsibility are distorted.
Finally, I point to a few cases in which the Supreme Court has,
perhaps inadvertently, considered the institution as a whole in deter-
mining whether constitutional norms have been violated and liability
is appropriate. One of these, Owen v. City of Independence,4 like the
cases discussed earlier, raises the issue of what is "official policy or
custom." The others, Parratt v. Taylor5 and Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 6 involve due process. We shall see that the promise of the
due process cases has not been fulfiled. The pull of the individual tort
model has proved too strong, leading the Court to retreat from the
structural analysis employed in Parratt.
4. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
5. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
6. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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I. THE LANGUAGE OF RESPONSIBILITY
The distortion begins in tort. The paradigm common-law case,
the framework in which issues of tort liability have been discussed,
sets an individual victim against an individual defendant who has done
some specific, relatively discrete act that affirmatively caused harm.
The question in torts, as in the common law generally, has been:
"When must we limit the presumptively free conduct of an individ-
ual?" 7 Legal standards are articulated as limitations on individuals.
Liability is imposed when one individual goes too far and intrudes on
the interests of another, presumably equally free, individual. Intrusive
behavior is not flatly prohibited, as it is by criminal law. Assigning
responsibility in tort is not, strictly speaking, dependent upon a con-
clusion that the defendant has gone too far by engaging in the harmful
behavior; rather, it means that the defendant has gone too far if she
fails to compensate those who have been injured by her conduct. The
primary and most pressing questions in tort so defined do not address
issues raised by more subtle or more diffusely caused harms, by affirm-
ative obligations, or by claims that conduct should be prohibited and
the resulting harm prevented.
It is certainly the case that not all tort litigants are individuals, but
standards of behavior for groups and institutions have been derived
without much modification from those devised for natural persons.
There has been no separate language for harms caused by groups or
institutions. The primary, and by now relatively comfortable, ques-
tions have been thought to be those raised by individual wrongs
against other individuals. Individualism has been made into some-
thing more than an attractive ethical or political ideal. In litigation
over harms, at least, it has been the method of analysis.
Tort law does not evaluate individuals as totally isolated units. To
some extent, it has been sensitive to the contexts, organizational and
otherwise, within which individuals act. Jurors are instructed that
they are to evaluate the defendant's behavior by reference to what "the
reasonably prudent person would do in the circumstances. " This for-
mulation has proved enduring precisely because it allows the consider-
ation of behavior in context; people who sit on juries may bring to bear
their own sense of the cultural and situational constraints on individ-
ual action. 9 It may thus be acceptable, for example, to argue that an
7. Cf O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).
8. 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.2, at 389 (2d ed. 1986)
(emphasis added).
9. The instructions may require the jury to take into account certain constraints: For exam-
ple, the jury may be told that an actor who is faced with an emergency is not to be held to the
November 1986]
HeinOnline  -- 85 Mich. L. Rev. 227 1986-1987
Michigan Law Review
individual acted reasonably given the limited vision, information, or
power created by his niche in a particular organization. Yet the focus
of the inquiry is still on what is fair to expect of an individual in a
given context, rather than on whether it is appropriate to require that
the context be changed. The jury is asked to evaluate the particular,
and relatively isolated, behavior of specified actors. The question, put
that way, seems relatively straightforward. And many characteristics
of tort litigation - the assumption that behavior can be fairly evalu-
ated according to standards drawn from the jurors' own experiences;
the rules about burden of proof, which fill in gaps in the narrative; and
the abstract nature of the instructions to the jurylo - direct the atten-
tion of the court and the jury away from real difficulties in describing
and understanding even individual behavior that causes discrete harm.
Even less attention is paid to injuries that cannot be traced to particu-
lar behavior, but are attributable to institutions, or to communities or
cultures within institutions - for the question is simply never put in
that form.
In traditional tort law, the need to create standards uniquely ad-
dressed to organizational behavior has been avoided because questions
of organizational responsibility have been assimilated into the doc-
trines of vicarious and strict liability. Under these doctrines, even
when an institution is the defendant, the court focuses on the conduct
of individual employees. Under vicarious liability, if the behavior of
an employee is found wanting under the reasonably prudent person
standard, the institution must pay. Institutional liability does not turn
on a conclusion that the institution itself has been found to have
caused harm; rather, the institution must pay because it employs a
person who has caused harm. Doctrines of strict liability do hold in-
stitutions responsible without requiring evidence that an individual
employee has done wrong. But here, too, liability is not based upon an
analysis of the wrongfulness of the institution's conduct; it is justified,
instead, as a mechanism for spreading the costs of injuries or for allo-
cating costs to the enterprise in which the institution is engaged. Some
forms of strict liability rest upon an inquiry into what the defendant
has done in a way that seems to involve a moral evaluation of behav-
ior; for example, strict products liability in torts requires a finding that
standard of conduct applied in more ordinary situations. See, e.g., Elmore v. Des Moines City
Ry. Co., 207 Iowa 862, 224 N.W. 28 (1929); Pennington's Admr. v. Pure Milk Co., 279 Ky. 235,
130 S.W.2d 24 (1939). And the youthfulness of a plaintiff may be the subject of special instruc-
tions, see, eg., Lewis v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 97 Il. App. 3d 227, 422 N.E.2d 889 (1981), or
even entitle her to what is, in effect, an immunity. See, e.g., Dunn v. Teti, 280 Pa. Super. 399,
421 A.2d 782 (1980).
10. See text at note 8 supra.
[Vol. 85:225
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the defendant has marketed a defective product.11 But the reference
point for evaluation is still an individual decisionmaker, though often
a hypothetical one. In cases seeking to impose strict liability for defec-
tive product design, for example, one way to put the question is to ask
whether the design decisions that were made would have been made
by a reasonably prudent designer.'
2
These ways of avoiding direct evaluation of institutional conduct
are not available in constitutional torts litigation. Vicarious liability of
local governments for the torts of their employees has been emphati-
cally rejected by the Supreme Court.13 Cost-allocation and cost-
spreading rationales have been found to be inconsistent with the legis-
lative history surrounding the enactment of section 1983,14 and both
theories do seem out of place in constitutional litigation. Cost alloca-
tion is a way of encouraging appropriate reduction of accidents
through the assignment of accident costs to those who can best decide
whether the benefits flowing from an activity are worth the risks it
runs. 15 But cost allocation raises the possibility that an activity, if it is
found to be too costly, will simply cease to take place. That is not an
option for government, which cannot cease to exist. And, to treat con-
stitutional wrongs as simply a cost of doing government business
seems unpalatable. Both cost-allocation and cost-spreading rationales,
if adopted, would suggest that constitutional injuries, like injuries re-
dressed through more ordinary torts, may be incurred if the appropri-
ate price is paid. Government without constitutional error, like a
world without accidents, is impossible, but adopting a language for
adjudication that focuses only on the decision of where to shift the
costs of such error brings with it a measure of despair.
Since the devices that have deflected common-law tort doctrine
from questions of institutional conduct have been eliminated in consti-
tutional cases against government bodies, an opportunity has been cre-
ated. The attention of the courts is necessarily directed toward the
responsibility of the institution as distinct from that of the individual.
It becomes possible to ask whether we have an adequate language for
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965); see also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson
Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
12. See, eg., Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 66, 577 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (1978);
Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 552-54, 332 A.2d 11, 20-21 (1975).
13. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
14. Monell, 436 U.S. at 693-94. But see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652-55
(1980), which accepts both rationales in rejecting a qualified immunity for municipal defendants.
It is significant, I believe, that the question before the Court in Owen was not one calling for a
determination of responsibility or "fault." See text at notes 163-78 infra.
15. G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 68-94
(1970).
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detecting and assessing injuries caused by organizations - for articu-
lating what we expect from government as a system or structure,
rather than what we expect from government officials as individuals.
What interests me is how difficult it has in fact been to talk about
systemic or structural injuries, to ask (much less answer) these ques-
tions. Even though the Court has clearly posed the question as one of
government responsibility independent of and distinct from vicarious
responsibility for official acts, the Court's opinions, and the tests they
articulate, still focus on the behavior of individual officials or postulate
a hypothetical individual decisionmaker. I do not mean to suggest
that the Court has been eager to hold individual officers liable. Quite
the contrary. Individual officers are protected from personal liability
by extensive immunities.16 These immunities are based on concerns
that are unique to suits against individual defendants: Immunity doc-
trines reflect both the courts' lack of confidence in their own ability to
evaluate and judge the behavior of persons in official positions who are
subjected to conflicting, often extreme, pressures in their jobs,1 7 and a
related sense that it may be both unfair and poor policy to burden
individual human beings working under these conditions with the full
weight of liability for often quite grievous harms. 18 What we have,
then, are many cases in which individuals as persons will not be held
personally liable - the named defendants are the government as gov-
ernment and individual defendants sued only in their official capacity
- but the discussion is still cast in terms of personal behavior and
personal wrongdoing.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION AGAINST INSTITUTIONS
As doctrine in cases brought under section 1983 developed
through the 1970s, judges in the lower federal courts, as well as in the
Supreme Court, sought to distinguish constitutional torts from com-
mon-law torts. But they tended to see that question as: Should liabil-
ity for constitutional torts go as far as liability under the common law?
Should it, for instance, include liability for negligence?19 Or is only
16. E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349
(1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
17. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
319-21 (1975).
18. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1978); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
424-28 (1976).
19. See, eg., Bonner v. Coughlin, 545 F.2d 565, 568 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[Ihe majority of
Circuits hold that mere negligence does not state a claim under Section 1983 [citing 13 circuit
cases]. Otherwise the federal courts would be inundated with state tort cases.... ."), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 932 (1978).
[Vol. 85:225
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that behavior which is covered by the most "egregious" of common-
law torts of sufficient importance to merit constitutional sanction? An
approach with the opposite emphasis simply was not considered.
20
The courts did not ask whether constitutional tort litigation might
reach questions of liability that were not addressed by common-law
tort, whether different measures of responsibility (measures not depen-
dent upon inquiries into efficiency or motive or intent) might be more
appropriate in evaluating government behavior.
This extremely cautious, even suspicious, approach to constitu-
tional tort actions - coupled with an attempt to limit constitutional
responsibility to egregious individual acts - can be found in a
Supreme Court opinion written several years before the Court ac-
cepted an interpretation of section 1983 that would permit suits
against governmental entities. The case is Rizzo v. Goode,21 a class
action in which the plaintiffs sought structural injunctive relief to re-
duce police abuses in the city of Philadelphia. Because the law at that
time did not permit direct suits against cities, the action was brought
against "those in charge" 22 of the city police. The majority opinion is
remarkable because the Court insisted on characterizing the case as a
suit between individual plaintiffs and individual defendants, yet simul-
taneously demonstrated considerable reluctance, even anger, at the
idea of holding the individual defendants responsible for the police
misconduct under attack. This reluctance permeates the opinion even
though the defendants were sued only in their official capacities and
would have been subject at most to injunctive relief.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began by adopting the
common-law tort paradigm as the standard for the outer limit of fed-
eral judicial authority. That paradigm represented, for him, what is
meant by article III's reference to "cases" and "controversies." A
lawsuit, if it is to be comprehensible to, and fall within the authority
of, a court, must be put into the framework of individual versus indi-
vidual, and the dispute must be about specific and precisely defined
injuries by individual defendants to individual plaintiffs. Article III,
read this way, requires that the plaintiffs point to an "injury in fact"
that they have suffered at the hands of the defendants. Forcing the
case into this framework, Justice Rehnquist described the "individual
20. But see Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196 n.5 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It would
indeed be the purest coincidence if the state remedies for violations of common-law rights by
private citizens were fully appropriate to redress those injuries which only a state official can
cause and against which the Constitution provides protection.").
21. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
22. 423 U.S. at 380.
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[plaintiffs'] claim to 'real and immediate' injury" in Rizzo as plausibly
based solely on the fear of "what one of a small, unnamed minority of
policemen might do to them."'23 Thus, despite the district court's con-
clusion that the plaintiffs had established a pattern of violations of
constitutional rights on the part of the Philadelphia police, the plain-
tiffs' "real" controversy was found to be, not with "those in charge" of
the police department, but with the individual officers on the street
who had directly inflicted unconstitutional blows. The Court would
not hear the claim, accepted by the lower court, that the police depart-
ment had failed to provide sufficient disincentives to police miscon-
duct, nor the claim that the department had by "official indifference" 24
actually encouraged such behavior. These claims could not be heard
because there was no room in the Court's concept of a "case" for eval-
uation of police practices as a system. The individual conduct of indi-
vidual defendants was assumed to be the only possible object of
judicial scrutiny; relief would be inappropriate in the absence of evi-
dence of a tight causal connection between harm to specific named
plaintiffs and the conduct of specific named defendants. In fact, since
this suit named only higher-level officials as defendants, a showing of
quite deliberate wrongdoing on the part of those officials was required.
The suit could not proceed because there had been no showing of an
"affirmative link" between established incidents of police misconduct
against the named plaintiffs and "the adoption of [a] plan or policy by
[defendants] - express or otherwise - showing their authorization or
approval of such misconduct."' 25
This formulation, which focuses on a "plan or policy," became
quite important in post-Rizzo cases. It requires not only individual
involvement by named officials, but individual involvement in the
form of explicit policy formulation. The Rizzo plaintiffs' theory of
causation was found to be too loose because they could point to no
explicit decision on the part of the defendants as the source of their
injury. This requirement, with its insistence on proof of explicit and
decisive action, is far more strict than any that has been applied at the
common law. The plaintiffs' argument in Rizzo was not a generalized
and unspecific attack on "the system" of the sort that would not have
been heard in tort. The plaintiffs claimed quite specific wrongdoing on
the part of the individual defendants - that they had neglected to
fulfill their constitutional duty to take steps to curb a pattern of police
misconduct. Justice Blackmun, in dissent, characterized the alleged
23. 423 U.S. at 372.
24. 423 U.S. at 382 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
25. 423 U.S. at 371.
[Vol. 85:225
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wrongdoing as "consciously permitting... subordinates ... to violate
the constitutional rights of persons with whom they deal."'26 But, ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, to say that officials have a "duty" to
respond to a pattern of abuse by their subordinates, and to say that
there has been a "default" when the pattern continues, "blurs accepted
usages and meanings in the English language. ' 27 Since the plaintiffs
had claimed only a tort of omission and thus made such a weak show-
ing of individual responsibility, the dispute did not fit into Justice
Rehnquist's concept of a "case." Rather, it was classified as political
- "a 'controversy' between the entire citizenry of Philadelphia and
[their] elected and appointed officials" 28 - and thus unfit for judicial
resolution.
29
The dissenters in Rizzo, joining in an opinion by Justice Blackmun,
were willing to let the plaintiffs' action proceed, but they, too, saw the
key question as one of individual behavior. They stressed the district
court's finding of "official indifference" 30 and would have based liabil-
ity on the named defendants' "acquiescence" in the face of "notice of
the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates. '3 1 The possibility
of liability for mere "failure to supervise" was suggested, but left for
another day.3 2 Justice Blackmun's disagreement with Justice Rehn-
quist was not over the propriety of turning an attack on the incentives
and disincentives created by the practices of the Philadelphia Police
Department into a case about individual misconduct. Justice Black-
mun disagreed, instead, about what the standard for evaluating indi-
vidual conduct should be.
In 1961, the Court had held in Monroe v. Pape33 that cities could
not be sued under section 1983. Between that time and 1978, the
26. 423 U.S. at 385.
27. 423 U.S. at 376.
28. 423 U.S. at 371.
29. Ironically, even those Justices most committed to this perspective have indicated in other
contexts that the more a case looks like a common-law case the less likely it is to be a proper
constitutional action. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976), decided the same Term as Rizzo, it
was the fit between the plaintiff's case and a common-law action for defamation that led Justice
Rehnquist, again writing for the Court, to dismiss the federal suit. Despite the plaintiff's allega-
tion that police action had deprived him of his interest in his reputation without due process of
law, the Court did not see a constitutional cause of action. Instead, there was simply a "legally
cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color of law.'"
424 U.S. at 699. A more accommodating response, the Court feared, would "derive from con-
gressional civil rights statutes a body of general federal tort law." 424 U.S. at 701 (citations
omitted).
30. 423 U.S. at 382.
31. 423 U.S. at 385 n.2 (quoting Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (7th Cir.
1969)).
32. 423 U.S. at 385.
33. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
November 1986]
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named defendants in constitutional tort cases like Rizzo were individu-
als (even though often sued in their official capacity). Language bor-
rowed from ordinary tort actions was, therefore, not strikingly
inappropriate. In 1978, the Court overruled Monroe. Monell v. De-
partment of Social Services34 held for the first time that constitutional
tort actions could be brought against municipal corporations. Monell,
then, was the first case in which the Court struggled explicitly with the
question: When is a wrong "done by" a government?
35
But the way in which that question was to be addressed was inevi-
tably influenced by the continuing debate over whether any section
1983 defendant could be held liable for "mere negligence" and by the
discussion in Rizzo v. Goode. The doctrinal background of Monell it-
self also encouraged the Justices to talk of entity responsibility as par-
allel to individual liability rather than to develop a language more
sensitive to the unique ways in which institutions cause harms. The
question before the Court in Monell was one of statutory interpreta-
tion, and the word to be interpreted was "person": Was a municipal
corporation a "person" subject to suit within the language of section
1983?36 One way to respond, perhaps the most obvious, was to look to
the meaning of "person" as used generally in statutes in 1871. The
Court concluded that by that time "it was well understood that corpo-
rations should be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes
of constitutional and statutory analysis."'37 Municipal corporations
were included as statutory referents by an extension of the concept of
"person"; this quite naturally led the Court to stress the similarities
between municipal corporations and natural persons, rather than the
differences. Also, section 1983, and its predecessor, defined the defen-
dant class as whoever "subjects [another], or causes [her] to be sub-
jected" to a constitutional wrong.38 Both verbs, and most especially
"cause," seemed to the Court to direct attention to ordinary tort con-
34. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
35. That question was submerged in the official-capacity cases like Rizzo, where individuals
were named as defendants but sued "in their official," as opposed to their "individual," "capac-
ity." These were treated as suits against individuals rather than institutions, but individual assets
were not at risk. One effect of Monell was to assimilate and redefine these cases. The Court
suggested, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55, and has since stated explicitly, see Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S.
464, 471-73 (1985), that these official-capacity suits are now, and always have been, in practical
effect, suits against the municipal employers who will pay for any damages awarded. One conse-
quence is that defenses available to municipal corporations, rather than the immunities available
to individual defendants, apply in official-capacity litigation. 469 U.S. at 472-73.
36. The statute provides that "Every person who [deprives another of his or her federal
rights] shall be liable ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added).
37. 436 U.S. at 687 (emphasis added).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) (emphasis added). The original Act read "shall subject, or cause
to be subjected." 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
[Vol. 85:225
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cepts of causation - in other words, to harms caused in the ways in
which individuals ordinarily harm each other. Its analysis of the stat-
ute, then, led the Court further along the path it had already marked
out in discussing supervisor liability in Rizzo v. Goode.
The bulk of the opinion in Monell was devoted to a justification of
its overruling of the previous decision in Monroe. The problem with
Monroe, the Court said, was that it had relied too heavily upon, and
indeed misread, a legislative skirmish that took place simultaneously
with the enactment of the predecessor of section 1983. That skirmish
resulted in the rejection of the Sherman amendment, which, though
the proposal took a variety of forms in the course of the legislative
debate, essentially sought to impose liability on municipal corpora-
tions for injuries caused by assemblies of the sort organized by the Ku
Klux Klan.39 In Monroe the Court had read that rejection as based
upon Congress' belief that it lacked the power to impose any obliga-
tion upon a municipality; if that was what Congress believed, it could
scarcely have intended to impose liability upon cities and counties
under section 1983.
Monell recharacterized the rejection of the Sherman amendment in
a way that cast no doubt on Congress' belief in its power to impose
some sort of liability on municipal corporations. According to this
recharacterization, it was not the imposition of just any civil liability
upon municipalities that Congress thought beyond its powers in 1871;
what was thought to be inappropriate, and indeed unauthorized by the
Constitution, 40 was imposing vicarious liability for the actions of riot-
ers who were not necessarily employees or even citizens of the munici-
pal defendant. The rejection of the Sherman amendment, then, cast
no doubt upon Congress' decision to hold a municipality liable "for its
39. The first conference committee draft of the Sherman amendment, for example, created a
cause of action for persons injured by
any persons riotously and tumultuously assembled together, with intent to deprive any per-
son of any right conferred upon him by the Constitution and laws of the United States, or to
deter him or punish him for exercising such right, or by reason of his race, color, or previous
condition of servitude ....
The action could be brought against the county, city, or parish in which the riot had occurred.
See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 749, 755 (1871), quoted in Monell, 436 U.S. at 666.
40. The fear was that the amendment would impose police obligations on municipalities even
where no such obligation had been imposed by the state. This would violate a notion of "coordi-
nate sovereignty," articulated in Supreme Court opinions such as Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 539 (1842), and Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871), by raising the threat
that federal obligations would disable municipal corporations from carrying out state policies.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 673-83. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986), the
Court characterized the discussion of legislative history in Monell as attributing the defeat of the
Sherman amendment to the argument "that, in effect, [the amendment] imposed an obligation on
local governments to keep the peace, and that the Federal Government could not constitutionally
require local governments to keep the peace if state law did not." 106 S. Ct. at 1298 n.7.
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own violations." The problem with the Sherman amendment was that
it "imposed damages without regard to whether a local government
was in any way at fault. '41 To avoid that problem it becomes impor-
tant to ask, in any suit against a local government, whether the munic-
ipal defendant is itself "at fault," whether the constitutional violation
is truly "its own."
The rejection of the Sherman amendment meant, under Monell's
revised reading of legislative history, that some basis for government
liability other than vicarious liability for the acts of individuals must
be found. This is the theme to which the Court in Monell kept re-
turning. It is a difficult theme, for there is no. obvious way to distin-
guish the acts of a municipality from the acts of the individuals whom
it employs, yet the Court felt committed by the rejection of the Sher-
man amendment to the proposition "that a local government may not
be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or
agents."' 42 The rejection of vicarious liability43 seemed to suggest to the
Court that the defendant municipality must be tied to the constitu-
tional injury alleged in a way that parallels the tie between the act of
an individual defendant and a plaintiff's injury in tort. Any looser, or
different, connection between defendant and injury would mean that
the injury was not the defendant's "fault."
In comparison to the extended reinterpretation of legislative his-
tory that justified the Court's overruling of Monroe, virtually no atten-
tion was given in Monell to the definition of what were indeed the
municipality's "own violations." The Court appeared to think the an-
swer to that obvious after its rejection of vicarious liability. And on
the facts of Monell, the answer could not have been more obvious.
Plaintiffs were challenging what all parties conceded to have been "a
citywide policy of forcing women to take maternity leave after the fifth
month of pregnancy." 44 The case involved a constitutional attack on
"formal, written policies of" city agencies, 45 and the attribution of the
constitutional violation to the municipality was quite straightforward.
41. 436 U.S. at 681 n.40.
42. 436 U.S. at 694.
43. The Court's conclusion that section 1983, read in light of the legislative history, prohibits
any imposition of vicarious liability upon municipal corporations is ultimately unpersuasive. All
that the rejection of the Sherman amendment indicated, by the Court's own description, was that
cities were not to be held vicariously liable for the acts of those who were neither employees nor
citizens. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 839 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 666-76 (1977)); Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1303 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
44. 436 U.S. at 661 n.2.
45. 436 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring).
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But the Court did not stop with saying that Monell was an easy
case. With virtually no introduction, it announced its definition of a
municipality's "own violations." The critical analysis is found in Part
III of the Monell opinion. The Court began by stating that, since Con-
gress had intended to allow suits against local governments to be
brought under section 1983, such defendants could be sued "where, as
here, the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or
executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially
adopted and promulgated by that body's officers."' 46 "Moreover," it
added cryptically, "like every other § 1983 'person,'" a municipality
may be sued for "deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'cus-
tom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval
through the body's official decisionmaking channels." 47 "Custom"
was further defined only by citations to prior cases in which the term
was said to encompass "persistent and widespread discriminatory
practices of state officials [which,] [a]lthough not authorized by writ-
ten law, [had become] so permanent and well settled as to constitute a
'custom or usage' with the force of law."'48 What was not permissible
was holding a municipality "liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor - or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable
under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. '49 To the Court, this
seemed to exhaust the possible bases of municipal liability:
We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under
§ 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead,
it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made
by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an en-
tity is responsible under § 1983.50
Although the Court warned that it was not addressing "what the full
contours of municipal liability under § 1983 might be,"'51 that caveat
has been read as leaving open questions of immunity, rather than sug-
gesting that "official policy and custom" is only a partial definition of
the scope of municipality liability.
52
There is no further explanation of why "official policy and cus-
tom" might be an exhaustive description of the ways in which a gov-
46. 436 U.S. at 690.
47. 436 U.S. at 690-91.
48. 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1970)). The
Court also referred to Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Brown-
ing, 310 U.S. 362, 369 (1940). Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 n.56.
49. 436 U.S. at 691.
50. 436 U.S. at 694.
51. 436 U.S. at 695.
52. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 624, 633 (1980).
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ernment can nonvicariously cause constitutional injuries. In Monell
the Court seemed to be looking for something parallel to an individ-
ual's decision to act, some indication of will or intent. Those concepts
cannot be applied in any obvious way to a government, though formal,
written policies may come close enough to the expressions of individ-
ual will to make the analogy seem possible and attractive. But formal
policies are not in any real sense analogous to individual decisions to
act; they are more closely analogous to formal statements or descrip-
tions by individuals of intent to act. The obvious problem with limit-
ing liability to situations in which the actor expresses his or her or its
intent to act is that liability can often be avoided by the simple expedi-
ent of keeping silent. That, presumably, is why the Court included
liability based on "official custom" as well as "official policy." But the
"'custom," apparently, must be "so permanent and well settled as to
[have] the force of law." 53 That is, it serves only as a stand-in for unex-
pressed intent.
The hard cases are those in which there is no written or otherwise
explicit statement of intent, yet the plaintiff alleges that the municipal-
ity has caused an injury in a way that cannot be analyzed by analogy
to a tort done by an individual actor. One case in which the Court
gave some indication of how it might view such claims is City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle. 54 Tuttle was shot and killed by Rotramel, a
city police officer who had been called to the scene of a "robbery in
progress. '5 5 Tuttle's widow sued the officer and the city for depriving
her husband of life without due process of law and for using excessive
force. At trial she prevailed against the city but not against the officer.
The verdict against the city was affirmed by the court of appeals56 but
reversed by the Supreme Court. The seven Justices who reiterated the
Monell requirement that official policy or custom must be established
to proceed against the city57 all agreed on this result. The problem,
the Justices concluded, was that under the instructions the jury could
have found the city liable solely on the basis of proof of the incident in
which Tuttle had died. The trial judge had instructed the jury that "a
single, unusually excessive use of force may be sufficiently out of the
53. 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168 (1969)).
54. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
55. The parties stipulated at trial that Tuttle had placed the call to the police. 471 U.S. at
811. There was testimony that the officer, upon arriving at the site, was told that no robbery had
occurred. 471 U.S. at 811.
56. Tuttle v. City of Oklahoma City, 728 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1984).
57. Justice Stevens would have overruled that part of Monell that refused to allow a city to be
held on the basis of vicarious liability. 471 U.S. at 841-42. Justice Powell took no part in the
decision.
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ordinary to warrant an inference that it was attributable to inadequate
training or supervision amounting to 'deliberate indifference' or 'gross
negligence' on the part of the officials in charge."58
In concluding that this instruction was erroneous the Supreme
Court rejected the possibility, accepted by both the district court and
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, that the character of a single inci-
dent could in itself indicate that official policy or custom was deft-
cient.59 To affirm a finding of liability on these grounds, the Justices
feared, would be equivalent to holding the city vicariously liable, re-
sponsible simply because it had employed the offending officer. 60 The
holding in Tuttle is not unremarkable given Monell's rejection of vi-
carious liability. It may simply be read as saying that one incident
without more tells us very little about institutional wrongdoing. The
more interesting, and more troubling, aspects of the Tuttle opinions lie
in the various remarks about what would be evidence of institutional
error. On that point, the signals given by the Court were quite
confusing.
At trial the jury had held the city liable to Mrs. Tuttle for
$1,500,000 in damages, but it found for the individual police officer on
the ground that he had acted in good faith. This result can be read,
and was read by the court of appeals, to indicate that the jury felt that
58. 471 U.S. at 813.
59. The court of appeals, describing the incident, pointed out that
Tuttle did not at any time brandish a weapon. In fact, Tuttle made no overt threat. Never-
theless, Officer Rotramel drew his gun and shot the decedent in the back. The latter was a
short distance from the officer and had gone down on one knee. No weapon was found on
the decedent; there was allegedly a toy gun which was said to have been found in Tuttle's
possession. This was not visible to the officer, but he said that he was apprehensive that the
decedent had a weapon.
728 F.2d at 458. On the issue of whether proof of this incident was sufficient to support munici-
pal liability, the Tenth Circuit had this to say:
In this case the individual defendant had been on the police force for a very short period of
time; moreover, he admitted his lack of training to cope with robberies. Nevertheless, he
was allowed to go in on a suspected robbery by himself. Also, his gross failure to success-
fully handle the problem clearly demonstrated his complete lack of training and also his lack
of ability. Thus the incident itself... attested to the officer's lack of knowledge and ability.
He claims to have considered Tuttle to be a robber but instead of pursuing him for the
purpose of questioning, he fatally shot him without the least justifiable provocation. The...
rule [that a single incident is not adequate evidence to establish liability for inadequate train-
ing and supervision] is not to be considered as an absolute where the circumstances plainly
show a complete lack of training.
728 F.2d at 461. Justice Brennan accurately understood this reasoning as akin to the tort doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur in that it would permit very strong circumstantial evidence to support a
conclusion of fault and causation on the part of the city. But Justice Brennan did not believe that
the circumstantial evidence was strong enough to support the inference in this case. 471 U.S. at
831 n.6.
60. The district judge had acknowledged the impropriety under Monell of basing a judgment
against the city on this sort of derivative liability, by his instruction to the jury that the city could
not be held liable for the denial of a citizen's constitutional rights by a police officer "simply
because of the employment relationship." 471 U.S. at 812.
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the officer had been placed, with inadequate training and without any
fault on his own part, in a frightening situation that he could not or
did not know how to handle. If the plaintiff could establish that this
was the case by evidence going beyond bare proof of the shooting,
would that be enough to support a judgment against the city?61 That
issue was addressed in a plurality opinion by Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing for himself and three other Justices, 62 and a concurring opinion
written by Justice Brennan, for himself and two other Justices. 63
Justice Brennan's opinion suggested that evidence of how an or-
ganization functions may be heard and is indeed essential if a case is to
be made out against a municipality. He was concerned that "there
may have been nothing that the city could have done to avoid" the
incident, that it may have been "attributable to numerous.., factors
for which the city may not be responsible; the police officer's own un-
balanced mental state [being] the most obvious example." 64 What Jus-
tice Brennan would require is some direct evidence that a "particular
action taken by the city" caused the deprivation of a constitutional
right. 65 This formulation leaves many questions unresolved. It is not
at all clear, for example, whether Justice Brennan would be receptive
to a claim that the structure of supervision in a police department
made it likely that an officer in an "unbalanced mental state" would go
undetected. 66 But there is a strong suggestion in his opinion that, at
least, the "substantial direct evidence concerning what [plaintiff] al-
leged to be the city's grossly inadequate policies of training and super-
vising police officers" 67 would have been adequate if believed by a jury
properly instructed.68 In this case, he stressed, plaintiff had pointed to
61. The plaintiff in Tuttle had offered such evidence, including testimony by an expert in
police training practices that the Oklahoma City training curriculum was grossly inadequate.
There was also evidence that Rotramel had had little or no training in when or how to handle a
"robbery in progress" report, and Rotramel's own testimony that he had been inadequately
trained. The problem for the Court was that, under the trial judge's instructions, the jury could
have imposed "liability even if it did not believe [plaintiff's] expert at all." 471 U.S. at 822. Note
that the interests of the city and the officer are in conflict if lack of training establishes both
"official policy or custom" on the part of the city and a "good faith" immunity on the part of the
officer, for the evidence that relieves the individual of liability overcomes the primary barrier to
imposing liability upon the city.
62. 471 U.S. at 810.
63. 471 U.S. at 824.
64. 471 U.S. at 831.
65. 471 U.S. at 829.
66. In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 1299 n.11 (1986), there is a strong
indication that Justice Brennan would require much more than this. In that case Brennan says
that "both the plurality and concurring opinions [in Tuttle] found plaintiff's submission inade-
quate because she failed to establish that the unconstitutional act was taken pursuant to a munici-
pal policy rather than simply resulting from such a policy in a 'but for' sense."
67. 471 U.S. at 826.
68. The Court had hoped to address this issue in City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 55 U.S.L.W.
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a series of "conscious choices" made by the city that
included official decisions concerning . .. : whether to permit rookie
police officers to patrol alone; what rules should govern whether a police
officer should wait for back-up units before entering a felony-in-progress
situation; how much time and emphasis to be placed on training in such
matters as how to approach felony-in-progress situations, when to use
firearms, and when to shoot to kill.
69
What is not clear is whether Brennan would be willing to describe less
explicit decisions as "action[s] taken by the city."
Justice Rehnquist's view of what sort of evidence could be ac-
cepted was more narrow, and, as in Rizzo, he seemed to assume that
the only proper way to evaluate the responsibility of a municipal
defendant is to look for indicia of the sort of "state of mind" that
marks out individual wrongdoers. Justice Rehnquist argued that the
plaintiff must point to a conscious decision by an officer or a body of
policymaking status. In this respect his opinion was similar to that
written by Justice Brennan, but Rehnquist made it clear that he would
require the plaintiff to point to something very deliberate and ex-
plicit.70 And Rehnquist raised the possibility, explicitly rejected by
Brennan, 71 that it might not even be enough to show that that munici-
pal decision has been the cause of a violation of the Constitution;
Rehnquist suggested that the plaintiff might be required to show that
the decision was itself unconstitutional. 72 It is hard to say what this
4239 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1987). In Kibbe, the First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Coffin, upheld a
verdict against the city for the death of a fleeing motorist shot by a police officer during a high-
speed chase. The court of appeals distinguished Tuttle on three grounds: There was no instruc-
tion allowing the jury to infer municipal policy solely from the occurrence of the harm; plaintiff
introduced sufficient evidence of gross negligence in failure to train police officers in how to
conduct high speed chases; and the chase involved "at least ten officers and three separate shoot-
ing incidents, in which three different officers fired their weapons .... This . . . widespread
activity.., is more likely to reflect the operating procedures of the police department than would
a single incident such as occurred in Tuttle." Kibbe v. City of Springfield, 777 F.2d 801, 805-06
(Ist Cir. 1985).
The defendant in Kibbe had argued below, and in its petition for certiorari, that a municipal-
ity could not be held liable, in a section 1983 action, for the inadequate training of its police
officers. The Court, in granting the petition, had thought the case "fairly included" the related
question whether something more than negligence would be required were liability for inade-
quate training to be allowed. After briefing and argument it became clear that the defendant had
failed to object below to the trial court's conclusion that gross negligence was the appropriate
standard to apply. Reluctant to resolve the general question of whether inadequate training
could ever be the basis for municipal liability, without the opportunity to address the issue of the
appropriate standard of care, a five-Justice majority concluded that the writ of certiorari should
be dismissed as improvidently granted.
69. 471 U.S. at 829 n.4.
70. See 471 U.S. at 824 n.7.
71. 471 U.S. at 833 n.8.
72. 471 U.S. at 824 n.7.
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might mean: Does Rehnquist intend to limit liability to policies that
are unconstitutional on their face?
What troubled Justice Rehnquist about the jury instructions in
Tuttle was not simply that they allowed the jury to draw certain infer-
ences about the state of the department's training on the basis of insuf-
ficient evidence. They also went too far in allowing inferences to be
drawn about
the state of mind of the municipal policymakers.... [Miore importantly,
the [instructions allowed the] plaintiff to establish municipal liability
without submitting proof of a single action taken by a municipal poli-
cymaker.... [A]t the least, [Monell's] requirement was intended to pre-
vent the imposition of municipal liability under circumstances where no
wrong could be ascribed to municipal decisionmakers.
73
The word "policy," Justice Rehnquist went on to say, "implies a
course of action consciously chosen from among various alternatives."
Thus, "it is ... difcult... to accept the submission that someone
pursues a 'policy' of 'inadequate training,' unless evidence be adduced
which proves that the inadequacies resulted from conscious choice -
that is, proof that the policymakers deliberately chose a training pro-
gram which would prove inadequate." 74
If this is to be the test of municipal liability - there is no discus-
sion of the possibility that official "custom," as distinct from official
"policy," may exist in the absence of a conscious decision by a poli-
cymaker - it will be very difficult to talk about harms done through
inertia or mistake. It may be possible to talk about the unconscious
and unconstitutional consequences of conscious decisions, but only if
the Court does not require that the policy itself be unconstitutional on
its face before it fulfills the requirement of Monell.75 And Justice
Rehnquist's opinion indicates that the decisions at stake will only be
those made at the most general level; he gave no attention to the possi-
bility that liability could be based on the decision to send someone
with Rotramel's training to respond to a report of a robbery in
progress.
No Justice in Tuttle welcomed the possibility of looking with some
73. 471 U.S. at 821.
74. 471 U.S. at 823. Now-Chief Justice Rehnquist joined in a dissent by Justice O'Connor
from the Court's disposition of City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 55 U.S.L.W. 4239 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1987). In her dissent Justice O'Connor took the position that failure to train police officers "may
serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to a reckless disre-
gard for or deliberate indifference to the rights of persons within the city's domain." 55
U.S.L.W. at 4242. In support of this conclusion, she referred to the common law's "willing[ness]
to trace more distant causation when there is a cognitive component to the defendant's fault." 55
U.S.L.W. at 4242. Justices Powell and White also joined the dissent.
75. See 471 U.S. at 824 n.7.
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flexibility into the effects of institutional structures. Justice Rehnquist
explicitly rejected the possibility. Justice Brennan left it open in a nar-
rowly written and cautious opinion. Justice Stevens, who filed a dis-
senting opinion, would have avoided the problem altogether by
overruling Monell and allowing the plaintiff to proceed under the com-
mon-law regime of vicarious liability.
Tuttle held that a single instance of egregious unconstitutional con-
duct by a single front-line officer is not "official policy." More re-
cently, in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 76 the Court held by a vote of
six to three that a single issue of explicit decisionmaking by an official
in a relatively high municipal position could establish "policy" even
though the decision was made in response to a discrete instance of
confrontation between citizen and government. The explicit decision
in Pembaur was made by a county prosecutor, who instructed deputy
sheriffs to "go in and get" witnesses who were thought to be hiding
behind a barricaded door in the office of the plaintiff, a doctor under
indictment for welfare fraud.77 The day after the initial pleadings in
Pembaur were filed the Supreme Court issued a decision7" accepting
the plaintiff's theory that, "absent exigent circumstances, the Fourth
Amendment prohibits police from searching an individual's home or
business without a search warrant even to execute an arrest warrant
for a third person."' 79 When Pembaur itself came before the Court, the
only question left was whether the plaintiff had introduced sufficient
evidence of "official policy" to allow the case against the county to
survive dismissal.
The decision to allow the case to proceed established that Monell's
reference to "policy" does not imply that the plaintiff must establish a
pattern of recurring or repeated conduct.80 A single statement is ade-
quate even if it does not purport to state what is generally appropri-
ate.8 ' The Pembaur decision also established that a decision need not
76. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
77. 106 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
78. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
79. 106 S. Ct. at 1295.
80. The Court was not presented with the issue whether such a pattern must be shown in
order to establish official "custom."
81. Justice Brennan, for the Court, said that "'official policy' often refers to formal rules or
understandings ... that are intended to, and do, establish fixed plans of action to be followed
under similar circumstances consistently and over time," as in Monell, but the term may also
refer to "a course of action tailored to a particular situation and not intended to control decisions
in later situations." 106 S. Ct. at 1299. Indeed, in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980), discussed in text at notes 152-78 infra, the Court had found municipal liability to be
appropriate even though a similar fact situation was unlikely to have occurred before or to occur
again. In his dissent in Pembaur, Justice Powell described Owen as based on the formality of the
procedures followed in reaching the government decision in Owen. 106 S. Ct. at 1309. As my
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be written, or otherwise articulated for general consumption, in order
to qualify as "official policy." The critical decision in that case con-
sisted simply of a response to a question posed in a telephone conver-
sation. (The deputies on the scene sought instructions from their
supervisor, who told them to call an assistant prosecutor. The assis-
tant then called the county prosecutor, who made the challenged deci-
sion.) 2 What was most important to Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, was that the decision be "properly made by [the] government's
authorized decisionmakers," that the "action [be] directed by those
who establish governmental policy."
'8 3
Justice Brennan defined his task, as it was defined in Monell, to be
the delineation of those "action[s] for which the municipality is actu-
ally responsible,"' 84 and "official policy" was, once again, described as
the obvious alternative to the rejected theory of respondeat superior
liability. The ability to point to a choice, a decision, by an individual
with ultimate authority resolved the problem for the Court.85 But, by
the time of Pembaur, it had become clear, as it should have been from
the beginning, that defining "official policy" as the opposite of respon-
deat superior offers no simple solution to the problem of delineating
what is the municipality's responsibility and what is the individual em-
ployee's. When Justice Brennan tried to explore Pembaur's implica-
tions for future cases, his majority dissolved into discordant voices,
whose individual positions suggest that the elaboration of Monell will
become increasingly tortuous.
Justice Brennan saw the critical step as finding a decisionmaker
with sufficient authority to make choices for the municipality. When a
decision is made by the local legislative body,86 the attribution of re-
sponsibility seemed, to him, to be easy. When other sorts of deci-
sionmakers are involved, Brennan, joined by three other Justices,
concluded that the question of authority to make policy is a question
of state law. It then became dispositive that the court of appeals in
Pembaur interpreted Ohio law to give the county prosecutor sufficient
discussion below indicates, however, the formal decision made in Owen was not in itself sufficient
to create the constitutional injury alleged by plaintiff there. See text at notes 153-59 infra; see
also note 87 infra (discussing Justice Brennan's statement that the official in question must at
least have the authority to make generally applicable policy).
82. 106 S. Ct. at 1294-95.
83. 106 S. Ct. at 1299.
84. 106 S. Ct. at 1298.
85. In a part of the opinion joined by only three other Justices, Brennan suggested that "cus-
tom" may be established without evidence of such an affirmative decision. That question was not
directly presented by Pembaur. 106 S. Ct. at 1299 n.10.
86. As, according to Justice Brennan, it was in Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622
(1980), and in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc,, 453 U.S. 247 (1981). 106 S. Ct. at 1298.
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authority to make county policy.87 Justice Powell responded, not un-
fairly, that this kind of analysis looks a great deal like respondeat supe-
rior liability, "at least with respect to a certain category of employees,
i.e., those with final authority to make policy."' 88 He asserted that "no
business organization or governmental unit makes binding policy deci-
sions so cavalierly."'89 But the problem is not so much with Brennan's
analysis as with the false promise of Monell. The true alternative to
respondeat superior is not to search for those few officials whose ac-
tions can be described as "official policy," but to ask questions about
how institutions can, as institutions, cause injuries.
Their own effort to make some sense of the dichotomy set up by
Monell led two of the Justices who otherwise joined in the Brennan
opinion to conclude that identifying a decision by an official with poli-
cymaking responsibility would not always be enough. Justice White
and Justice O'Connor thought that Monell's reference to "official pol-
icy" required the court to evaluate the state of the law at the time of
the challenged decision in the jurisdiction in which that decision was
made. If the decision, even though made by the highest executive or
legislative authority of a local governing body, violated federal, state,
or local law at the time that it was made, that decision could not,
according to White and O'Connor, be characterized as "official pol-
icy" - for "[w]here the controlling law places limits on their author-
ity, [local officials] cannot be said to have the authority to make
contrary policy." 90 To hold otherwise, so that municipalities could be
87. In a footnote, Justice Brennan distinguished between giving an official, such as a sheriff,
the "discretion to hire and fire," and giving that official the authority to "establish[] county
employment policy." Only the latter would make that official's decisions municipal "policy."
Thus, there would be no municipal liability for even an unconstitutional firing unless the decision
to fire were made by an official or group of officials who had the authority to make general
employment policy. 106 S. Ct. at 1300 n.12. Here Brennan concluded that the prosecutor,
although he had not made general policy in this case, had the authority to do so. 106 S. Ct. at
1301.
The application of this language in an employment case is before the Court in Praprotnik v.
City of St. Louis, 798 F.2d 1168 (8th Cir. 1986), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. 871 (1987).
88. 106 S. Ct. at 1308 (Powell, J., dissenting).
89. 106 S. Ct. at 1308.
90. 106 S. Ct. at 1301 (White, J., concurring). This argument is reminiscent of the fictional
split between the exercise of official state power and the exercise of individual, private authority
by one who holds a state position. That fiction was central to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), in which the Court held that a suit seeking to enjoin a state attorney general from insti-
tuting proceedings to enforce a state statute that reduced railroad rates was not a suit against the
state barred by the eleventh amendment, because
[tihe act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name
of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act ... is a proceeding without the authority of
and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is
simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of
the State to enforce [an unconstitutional statute].
209 U.S. at 159. It is even more reminiscent of the arguments made by Justice Frankfurter, and
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held liable for "deliberate or mistaken acts [of officials] admittedly
contrary to local law," would be to do what Monell forbids: to rest
"on the basis of respondeat superior."91 White joined in Justice Bren-
nan's opinion because the forcible entry was not "illegal under federal,
state or local law" at the time of the prosecutor's decision in
Pembaur.9
2
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist in dissent, placed exactly the opposite significance on the state of
the law of the circuit at the time of the prosecutor's decision. Powell
argued that there simply had been no violation of the Constitution
because forcible entries without search warrants had been expressly
approved by the federal court of appeals with jurisdiction over Ohio at
the time of the decision. The question, he said, was whether to apply
the Steagald93 decision "retroactively" 94 in a damage action brought
for conduct occurring before Steagald had been announced. 95 Powell
rejected by the Court, in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 17 (1944) (concurring opinion, in
which Justice Frankfurter argued that there was no "state action" as required by the fourteenth
amendment where the defendants had acted "in defiance of [their] duty.., under [state] law,"
and that there could be no "state action" "until the highest court of the State confirms such
action and thereby makes it the law of the State"), and in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 240-41
(1961) (dissenting opinion, in which Justice Frankfurter argued that conduct cannot be said to be
"under color" of state law within the meaning of section 1983 when it is "allegedly violative of
federal constitutional rights, but plainly violative of state law").
Were the approach of Justices White and O'Connor to be accepted by a majority of the
Court, it could mean that certain cases of first impression where the challenged municipal action
violates state or local law would be difficult to bring to a federal court for decision on the merits.
Where state or local law prohibits the conduct in question but there is no federal decision estab-
lishing its unconstitutionality, a damage action against an individual official defendant would be
barred by Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), which protects individual officials who
have not violated "clearly established ... constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." And an injunction action might be dismissed, under City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), which denies standing to seek an injunction to those plaintiffs who
cannot establish that they are likely to be future victims of the conduct sought to be enjoined.
The White-O'Connor approach also, of course, makes the viability of section 1983 suits against
municipal defendants vary according to the law of the municipality, state, and perhaps even
circuit, in which the conduct occurred.
91. 106 S. Ct. at 1302.
92. 106 S. Ct. at 1301. Justice O'Connor went even further. She inferred the existence of
official policy to engage in the challenged conduct from the fact that that conduct was not in
violation of the applicable law: "Given that this procedure was consistent with federal, state and
local law at the time the case arose, it seems fair to infer that respondent county's policy was no
different [than the city's policy, which was conceded to be as plaintiff alleged]." 106 S. Ct. at
1304 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
93. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981); see text at notes 78-79 supra.
94. Justice White left open the possibility that he would agree with this analysis. Like Justice
Brennan, he did not reach the question of the retroactivity of Steagald on the grounds that it had
been conceded by the county. See 106 S. Ct. at 1302 n.*.
95. Note that this chronological sequence also provides the basis for a qualified immunity for
the individual decisionmaker. He or she can be held liable in damages only for acts that violate
constitutional rights that are clearly established at the time of the challenged action. Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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concluded that Steagald should not be applied to Pembaur for two
reasons. The first was his sense that constitutional cases against indi-
vidual defendants involve unique notions of fairness96 beyond those at
stake in actions for common-law torts: "Civil liability should not at-
tach unless there was notice that a constitutional right was at risk."
'97
The second reason, fear of overdeterring law enforcement officers,
combined the concerns Powell expressed in his opinion for the Court
in Stone v. Powel198 with the desire, found in the cases involving indi-
vidual immunities, 99 not to discourage vigorous executive action.
Powell argued that section 1983 liability is primarily designed to deter,
rather than to compensate; that local officials "are justified in relying
on the judgment of the applicable federal court"; and that there is
"nothing to deter" when there is "nothing that should have caused the
officials to 'harbor doubts about the lawfulness of their intended
actions.' "100
Both White's and Powell's approaches go beyond Brennan's in
looking at the structure of incentives in the environment as a whole at
the time of the challenged behavior. But both assume a consistency
throughout the system - indeed, a reduction of the system to a single
decisionmaker, the court - that overlooks the ambiguous ways in
which government can operate. White would argue that once "the
law" has been made clear by a court, the government cannot be con-
sidered responsible for any departures from that standard, however
widespread, egregious, or authoritative those departures may be.
Powell would relieve executive and legislative officials from any obli-
gation to consider constitutional requirements once a court has spo-
ken; he shows a concern that, at bottom, is still focused on the
individual decisionmaker rather than the organization. °10
The effort to distinguish constitutional torts from ordinary torts
has led, in suits against individuals, to an insistence that the wrong be
96. See 106 S. Ct. at 1306 (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978)).
97. 106 S. Ct. at 1306.
98. 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding that fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims cannot
normally be raised in federal habeas corpus because the additional deterrent effect that such an
avenue of redress would afford is outweighed by the costs in excessive litigation and freeing the
guilty). Pembaur, of course, is not an exclusionary rule case, so Stone is not directly applicable,
and Justice Powell did not, in fact, refer explicitly to that case.
99. See, e.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). Justice Powell cited Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976) (prosecutorial immunity). Pembaur, 106 S. Ct. at 1306.
100. 106 S. Ct. at 1306-07 (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980)).
101. For a discussion of Justice Powell's sensitivity to the position of those individuals who
make up the government, and his inclination to view governmental actions as actions by individ-
ual decisionmakers operating in good faith to deal with difficult problems, see Whitman, Individ-
ual and Community: An Appreciation of Mr. Justice Powell, 68 VA. L. RaV. 303 (1982).
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somehow more egregious than that ordinarily remedied through tort.
That requirement has been carried over to suits against institutions,
where an additional effort to distinguish constitutional torts has led to
the rejection of vicarious liability. But without vicarious liability,
some way of telling when an institutional defendant can be said to
have caused harm by "its own violation" of constitutional norms is
necessary. The Court has not devised a formulation that springs free
of the language of individual wrongdoing. In Monell the question was
easy because of the formal and explicit nature of the government rule
under attack. The Court could evaluate the rule as it has become ac-
customed to evaluating legislative action embodied in statutes. When
such a text is missing, the Court has searched for an individual with
sufficiently high authority to "speak for" the government. The search
for a mind to evaluate continues.
III. THE PULL OF THE INDIVIDUAL MODEL
The effort to define the proper sphere for constitutional torts began
with early efforts, not yet completely abandoned, to define a suffi-
ciently egregious "state of mind" or "standard of care" to be applied
to the individual officers named as defendants. Intent or deliberate-
ness was often required. Once municipalities could be sued a similar
approach took firmer root in cases against government defendants:
those violations which are the government's "own," those for which it
can appropriately be held to respond with damages or. other relief,
were defined as those that flow from choice or decision sufficiently de-
liberate to be called "official policy." This mode of analysis adopts
tort concepts to evaluate questions that have not been posed in tort. It
pushes the discussion into a search for a person whose mind or con-
duct can be evaluated in tort language and blinds courts to the ways in
which harms can be caused by institutional structures and processes.
A. Tort Analogies
The Rizzo requirement of an "affirmative link" between the de-
fendants' behavior and the plaintiff's injury, as applied to that case,
seems to refer to common-law tort concepts of fault and causal con-
nectedness, for tort provides the language that we use to attribute re-
sponsibility. It is this requirement of an "affirmative link" that "state
of mind," "standard of care," and "official policy or custom" are
meant to satisfy. To require the plaintiff to establish the defendant's
"state of mind" - a particular intent, or attitude, or purpose - is to
assume, quite literally, that the defendant will have a mind to evaluate.
Presumably the mind is that of a designated official; there are obvious
[Vol. 85:225
HeinOnline  -- 85 Mich. L. Rev. 248 1986-1987
Constitutional Torts
problems with finding where mind lies when the defendant is a govern-
ment. When the requirement is put in terms of "standard of care" the
problems are somewhat, but not entirely, different. At first glance it is
not absurd to argue that section 1983 requires, even in actions against
municipalities, something more than mere negligence, the violation of
a more stringent standard of care than that applied in the routine com-
mon-law tort. 102 Negligence is, first-year law students are taught, an
"objective" standard, necessarily an evaluation of the defendant's con-
duct rather than of her mind.10 3 But negligent conduct may be said to
be wrongful because of the attitude that it suggests, and in that sense
an inquiry into the existence of negligence ultimately also refers to the
evaluation of a mind. Whether analyzed as a moral or an economic
injunction,1°4 negligence in tort is at root a variously elaborated re-
quirement that the injurer take some care to anticipate the potential
victim's interests and consider them sympathetically.105 It imposes, in
a sense, a standard of empathy: We must weigh each other's interests
as our own. It requires a reciprocity of concern. Another way of put-
ting this, perhaps more congenial to economists, is that we must evalu-
ate proposed conduct from a disinterested perspective, a perspective in
which all merely personal choices are assumed to be of equal value.
We are, it seems, still talking about a way of thinking. But, again, do
institutions think?
Appropriately, the Supreme Court has never accepted a general
requirement that something more than negligence be established in or-
der to bring a claim under section 1983 against either municipal or
individual defendants.10 6 The statute, as the Court has understood,
provides a remedy for wrongs defined elsewhere; it does not establish
substantive requirements of its own, other than that the violation of
federal rights be "under color of" state or local law.' 0 7 But when the
Court has looked elsewhere for the definition of those wrongs sought
to be remedied in section 1983 litigation, it has often read specific con-
stitutional provisions to include a "state of mind" requirement, to pro-
102. See text at notes 19-20 supra.
103. See 3 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, supra note 8, § 16.2, at 390-93; O.W. HOLMES,
supra note 7, at 107-09.
104. Compare O.W. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 92-95, with Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1
J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-33 (1972).
105. Cf. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal 87 YALE L.J.
697, 702-03 (1978); J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 199-200 (1975).
106. This possibility was explicitly rejected in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1981),
and the rejection was reaffirmed in Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986), which overruled
Parratt's conclusion that negligent takings were "deprivations" for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. See text at notes 194-221 infra.
107. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
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hibit only government action taken with a specific, improper purpose
or attitude. The eighth amendment, for example, has been interpreted
to prohibit only actions that indicate "callous indifference" to the
fights of others.108 And the equal protection clause has been read to
require an "intent to discriminate."' 10 9 In these cases, the Court has
not only required a showing of something more than negligent con-
duct, it has created a kind of "intentional tort" that is much more
difficult to establish than any such tort at common law precisely be-
cause it requires evaluation of actual state of mind rather than of con-
duct as a clue to that mind.
One reason why it might have seemed plausible to ask whether
something more than negligence must be proved in a constitutional
case is that, to the extent that there are tort analogies to constitutional
cases, they most often come from intentional torts. But even wrongs
that can be described as trespass,110 assault and battery, ' false im-
prisonment,112 or defamation 1 3 take on new urgency when the de-
fendant is the government. When the government is the wrongdoer,
ordinary injury is augmented by the abuse of government power, and
the Constitution has appropriately been read to address these aug-
mented injuries in their own terms, rather than by analogy to com-
mon-law torts.
1 14
When the Court requires the plaintiff to establish that the defend-
ant had an intent to discriminate in an equal protection case,115 or
finds dispositive an intent to penalize the exercise of speech in a first
108. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). When evaluating the use of force during a prison
disturbance, the standard is even higher: The eighth amendment is violated only when the force
was not "applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline [but used] maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." Whitley v. Albers, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1085
(1986) (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973)).
109. See, eg., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41 (1976). See also the discussion in text
at notes 194-221 infra of Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986), and Davidson v. Cannon,
106 S. Ct. 668 (1986); in those cases, the Court held that the due process clause addresses only
intentional deprivations of life, liberty, or property.
110. E.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
111. E.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
112. Eg., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
113. E.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
114. Cf Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 196-98 (1961) (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting that a
"state-approved" constitutional deprivation seems more offensive than a state tort). The inclina-
tion, found in some early lower court opinions, eg., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969),
to resolve section 1983 disputes solely by reference to the elements of common-law causes of
action has virtually disappeared.
115. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976).
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amendment case,116 it is looking for motive, for the purpose behind the
act' 17 - an inquiry that is irrelevant to intentional tort at common
law.'"8 The intent that triggers liability at common law represents a
cruder attempt to detect those who harbor an improper attitude to-
ward those around them. As in negligence, the improper attitude is
assumed from the consequences. And those consequences need not
support an inference of ill will or nefarious purpose; it is sufficient that
they support an inference of intent to touch the person or property of
another (or to move your body in a way that is "substantially certain"
to result in such a touching). 119 The constitutional requirement more
deliberately and directly penalizes the defendant's attitude toward the
plaintiff.
This emphasis on attitude and purpose, while it may be a troubling
limitation in constitutional litigation generally, is nonsense in suits
against defendants who are governments, for it focuses precisely on
that element that exists in individuals but not in institutions - on
mind. It is not that "mere negligence" should be enough to state a
constitutional case,120 but that to ask about negligence, at least as a
reflection of attitude or motive, is to pose the wrong question. When
the defendant is an institution it has no human face.121 It is not sur-
prising that the plaintiff may often see herself as an asserter of rights
with no corresponding obligation in return. 122 The root legal obliga-
tion cannot be defined in terms of empathy or mutual care. That cast
of mind, implicit in many formulations of the negligence requirement,
makes no sense when the defendant is necessarily not an individual,
but an institution or its representative. There is no mind, and no pos-
sibility that she who sues as plaintiff could stand in the place of the
defendant.
There is another way to read common-law negligence that makes
no claim to evaluating mind. In this reading, negligent behavior is "at
116. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commr. of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
579-80 (1983).
117. See, eg., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977) (judicial deference is unnecessary "[wlhen there is a proof that a discriminatory
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision").
118. E.g., Vosburg v. Putney, 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
119. E.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955); Vosburg v. Putney, 80
Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
120. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 532 (1981).
121. This is not the case when the defendant is a named police officer or other relatively low-
level government agent. In those cases, the plaintiff and the defendant can both be described as
people subject to worry and institutional pressures. See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 59-81
(1983); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 56-62 (1981).
122. See, eg., M. SHAPO, THE DUTY TO ACT: TORT LAW, POWER & PUBLIC POLICY
(1977).
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fault" and sufficient to trigger the responsibility to make an injured
plaintiff whole because it is inefficient and wasteful of society's re-
sources. As described by Judge Learned Hand1 23 in terms enshrined
by Judge Richard Posner,124 tort liability sanctions negligence in order
to provide incentives to engage in less wasteful behavior. It encour-
ages actors to evaluate the risks and gains of various courses of con-
duct from the perspective of all those potentially at risk and to avoid
those activities in which "the benefits in accident avoidance exceed the
costs of prevention." 125 There is some strain in applying this concept
to individual behavior. If the standard upon which liability turns is
not to be unduly harsh, there must be some fair expectation that po-
tential defendants can and should act reasonably, that failure to do so
is sufficiently aberrant to call forth heavy sanctions when another is
injured. This expectation, applied to ordinary human conduct, may be
unrealistic. We all act unreasonably much, perhaps most, of the time.
By this I do not mean to say that rational behavior never occurs - I
hope that it is not infrequent. My point is, rather, that the negligence
standard is high and the failure to meet it is not always, or even typi-
cally, due to aberration or moral failure in any obvious or natural
sense. Accidents are seldom simply the result of egregious careless-
ness or any other behavior that we can easily condemn as morally
wrong. Physical incapacities, fatigue, inattention, preoccupation, and
stress play a role. The rule of negligence sets a standard that none of
us is capable of meeting much of the time. It is no answer to allow
excuses for physical incapacity and other hindrances to rational be-
havior. Even if they could be the subject of proof, physical incapaci-
ties cannot be easily distinguished from those mental incapacities that
affect the actor's ability to understand and conform to norms. And
allowing excuses for mental incapacities of this sort calls the entire
enterprise into question, for incapacity in this sense cannot in practice
be neatly separated from the deliberate refusal to accept others' val-
ues.126 Our very ability to perceive and participate in the standards of
the community in which we live varies from individual to individual in
a manner inaccessible to evaluation by a court.
It might be argued that the negligence standards devised by tort
law - even though they have been developed in response to questions
about individual obligations and the propriety of specific, rather finite
123. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
124. Posner, supra note 104, at 32-33.
125. Ia at 33.
126. See Henderson, Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 901, 912 & n.52, 920
n.89 (1982).
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behavior - are particularly well-suited to evaluating the conduct of
institutions once those standards are broken free from the concept of
mind and only address behavior. Institutions, the argument would go,
may be more able than individuals to make sophisticated analyses of
the risks of courses of conduct. This is so because organizations, espe-
cially those organizations that engage in repetitive risky behavior, pos-
sess the resources to acquire large amounts of information over time
and to hire employees with the training and expertise necessary to as-
sess risk. To the extent that the negligence test is an effort to capture
inefficient activities, it may seem to be most fairly applied to institu-
tional actors, who are in the best position to perform the comparison
of costs that the formula requires. 127 Indeed, strict liability, if imposed
to provide a practical assurance that an actor will fairly evaluate the
interests of others before she acts, 128 may be most appropriately ap-
plied to institutional actors for the same reason.
But even so formulated, negligence language, although it might
make most sense when applied to institutions rather than to individu-
als, does not seem adequate to the task of charting institutional re-
sponsibility for injuries. The common-law negligence test as it has
been applied, even in cases of institutional defendants, focuses on iso-
lated decisions and isolated injuries. It overlooks issues that are
unique to institutional behavior - for example, problems of massed
power, of cumulative injury, and social planning. And, institutions
are not immune from the problems of lack of information and incom-
petence that afflict individuals. The actors that compose institutions
are individuals, and even in groups individuals may act in ways that
reflect stupidity or inattention. In fact, institutional structures may
create their own pressures toward "nonrational" or wasteful behavior.
An employee may prefer inaction because that is least likely to get her
into trouble. 129 Her desire to please her superiors, impress her peers or
put her subordinates in their place may lead her to rash and foolish, or
simply evasive, behavior. Those in the position to set policy may find
127. Cf Rodgers, Negligence Reconsidered: The Role of Rationality in Tort Theory, 54 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1980) (even the most rational actors cannot be aware of, and take steps to
prevent, "highly improbable risks beyond the range of the rational calculus").
128. An argument for strict liability is that the courts cannot make an accurate cost-benefit
analysis in every case. If they could, the threat of liability for negligence would be sufficient to
encourage efficient behavior, for inefficient behavior would subject an actor to liability. See Pos-
ner, supra note 104, at 32-33. To the extent that courts cannot accurately detect inefficient be-
havior and therefore let some such behavior go unsanctioned, the incentives provided by the
negligence system are imperfect. Strict liability places all costs on the actor, whether his behav-
ior is inefficient or not. He then has an incentive to act efficiently in order to minimize the costs
to himself, for he will bear them all.
129. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 121, at 71-73.
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it easiest to overlook the misconduct of their subordinates. (Perhaps
this is what happened in Rizzo.) The injury may be made much
greater by the simultaneous or cumulative acts of several departments
unaware of the steps being taken by each other, accidental injury may
be the consequence of a series of decisions made by several employees,
no one of whom perceived the whole and understood the risk being
run. 130 If institutions are to be held liable for these injuries it is be-
cause concepts of fairness in attribution of responsibility that have
been developed for individuals are not applicable in imposing liability
upon institutions. But the greater danger of our lack of language
unique to institutional responsibility is that, by focusing only on one
incident of decisionmaking or injury, injuries caused by institutional
structures will not even be perceived.
B. The Alternative
The Supreme Court's response to these dilemmas, in the decisions
described above, was not to move beyond casting the evaluation in
terms of individual wrongdoing, but to look for an individual (or indi-
viduals) who could be analyzed in the government's stead because he
could be said to act for the government. In addition, it was assumed
without discussion that government acts as government only when it
plays the role of decisionmaker, or legislature. So the inquiry took the
form of a search for those persons, and those legislative bodies, who
make decisions: government "policy or custom" was "made by [a lo-
cal government's] lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may
fairly be said to represent official policy."' 131 Much of the post-Monell
litigation has revolved around the question of whether a particular of-
ficial had sufficient status and authority to act as a decisionmaker for a
municipality.132
After Monell the Court was caught between its commitment to the
rejection of government liability "for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents," 133 and the only language it possessed for ascrib-
ing responsibility for injuries - tort language which describes wrong-
doing and causation in terms that were devised for the actions of
individuals. The Court had no language for describing how an institu-
130. One of these possibilities may explain what happened in Owen v. City of Independence,
445 U.S. 622 (1980); see notes 152-78 infra and accompanying text.
131. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
132. See, eg., Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1016 (1985); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1983); Berdin v. Duggan, 701
F.2d 909 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983); Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th
Cir. 1982).
133. 436 U.S. at 694.
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tion or a government uniquely acts, so it looked to acts, such as pas-
sage of ordinances or regulations, or decisions by those with a very
high level of authority, that, in essence, label themselves as institu-
tional or governmental. There must, the Court seems to have decided,
be some formal decision of this sort. To count every official's decisions
as forming government "policy" would be tantamount to imposing re-
spondeat superior liability. "Official policy or custom," defined as con-
scious choices made by high-level decisionmakers, seemed the only
option between vicarious liability and no liability.
There are other alternatives. The Court in Monell implicitly re-
ferred to some of them in describing the extraordinary reach of the
first conference substitute for the amendment proposed by Senator
Sherman. That proposal
imposed liability on the government defendant whether or not it has no-
tice of the impending riot, whether or not the municipality was author-
ized to exercise a police power, whether or not it exerted all reasonable
efforts to stop the riot, and whether or not the rioters were caught and
punished. 134
Under a statute that, unlike the proposed amendment, accepted these
limitations on municipal liability, a government could still be held lia-
ble for conduct that did not involve an official decision to act. That is,
the municipal defendant could be held liable for those cases in which it
had notice of an impending riot and possessed the power to stop it, yet '
reasonable preventative steps were not taken and the rioters escaped.
Liability could be imposed in such a case - whatever the source of the
failure, be it an official decision to turn a blind eye to the riot or simply
excessive diffusion of responsibility - without encroaching on the
concerns implicit in Congress' rejection of the Sherman amendment.
The Court's formulation ignores this option. It requires a decision.
Caught by the language of tort, the Court apparently has concluded
that liability based on, for example, cumulative inattention, or diffu-
sion of responsibility, would be inconsistent with Rizzo v. Goode's in-
sistence on an "affirmative link" between individual victim and
individual wrongdoer, the precursor of Monell's rejection of vicarious
liability.135
But the assumption that all categories of liability must be divided
into either vicarious liability or affirmative decisions is not even sup-
ported by tort law as applied to individuals, 136 and it is particularly
134. 436 U.S. at 668.
135. 436 U.S. at 692; see also 436 U.S. at 694 n.58.
136. Some of the alternatives to vicarious liability in tort - such as liability for intentional
torts, which requires an intent to make a specified wrongful incursion on another's person or
property, or strict products liability, which requires a decision to engage in the business of selling
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strained and inappropriate in discussing the injurious effects of institu-
tions. Even if individual liability for constitutional torts could be
fairly limited to affirmative misbehavior, institutions occupy space in
the world in a different way than individuals do, and the conse-
quences, both beneficial and harmful, of their actions are created dif-
ferently. The shape and the existence of institutional bodies are the
result of choices that continue over time and that can be modified.
This is simply not true in the same way of individuals. Institutions
"think" differently, or, more accurately, they don't think at all, yet
they create consequences. In evaluating individual liability, Anglo-
American tort law has not as a general rule held defendants liable for
omissions, for failures to act. 137 This seems to have been what con-
cerned the Court in Rizzo, 138 and again in Monell. 139 But institutions
do something "affirmative" by simply existing, and, unlike individuals,
they can change their form of existence or simply cease to exist.
One does not exhaust what an individual is and does by looking
only to declared purposes and intent. That is even more true of organ-
izations. I have suggested some of the problems above: Institutions
cause consequences even through diffusion of responsibility. Or
through common practices that are widespread but do not "have the
force of law" and may even be flatly prohibited by "official" regula-
tions. And there are structural disincentives to take action or to see
problems, and, more affirmatively, communal mores or fellow feelings
that lead those within an institution to rank the interests of each other
higher than the interests of those outside. At the least, we cannot be
as confident as the Court seems to be that the language of choice and
intent and motive is adequate for evaluating the behavior of
governments.
One danger of a narrowed inquiry into government responsibility
is that it will prevent the Court from recognizing that consequences
may be created over time, or that several branches of a government
may work together to create a constitutional tort where no such tort
would exist were the activity of only one branch considered. The
Court has not been completely unwilling to evaluate the way in which
an institution functions as a whole or over time. But the most obvious
example of such thinking - the school desegregation cases following
a particular product - do require proof of a particular sort of decision. But negligence, although
it can be applied to conduct flowing from a decision, does not ask whether a decision to act (or
fail to act) in a certain way has been made.
137. See, ag., Buch v. Amory Mfg., 69 N.H. 257, 44 A. 809 (1898).
138. 423 U.S. at 370-71.
139. 436 U.S. at 692 (citing Rizzo).
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Brown v. Board of Education 140 - reveals an entrenched unwilling-
ness to follow such an approach to its conclusion. In the desegrega-
tion cases the Court, although requiring evidence of a deliberate
discriminatory decision made by the board defendants, 141 has evalu-
ated each district's school board as an ongoing institution. A conclu-
sion that the Constitution has been violated can be reached on the
basis of acts of deliberate segregation committed by members whose
service ended years before, and once such a conclusion has been
reached it will support an order that remedial steps be taken by cur-
rent board members who themselves have made no discriminatory de-
cisions. 142 But this step was relatively easy - the board could still be
described, by analogy to an individual and like a legislature, as a single
maker of formal decisions. Once a finding has been made that a
board, albeit in an earlier incarnation, has unconstitutionally discrimi-
nated, the remedies for this discrimination have been broadly crafted
to create a functioning desegregated system 14 3 - a goal that necessar-
ily requires a broad view of how the structure of schools within a dis-
trict might best work to minimize the effects of past segregation. Aside
from the remedial implications and the willingness to consider a
school board as a single institution over time, rather than as a shifting
group of individuals, these decisions break no very significant ground.
In their refusal to reach de facto segregation the decisions retain the
basic requirement that one individual, or a group of individuals, be
shown to have made a decision motivated by an unconstitutional in-
tent to discriminate on the basis of race. Even if the evaluation can
extend back in time, the requirement that a particular state of mind be
established in an identifiable individual or individuals remains. These
cases are, from that perspective, quite consistent with the Court's in-
sistence on reducing the question of institutional responsibility to one
of individual wrongdoing. They represent no true alternative, but they
suggest that movement away from the individual model is not
impossible.
C. Implications
If it were to pursue seriously the matter of how an institution func-
tions as a whole, the Court would have to ask questions that have no
140. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
141. In Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973), a majority of the Court rejected de facto
segregation as a basis for finding that the equal protection clause had been violated.
142. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
143. Penick, 443 U.S. at 458-61; Swann, 402 U.S. at 13, 15-16.
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parallel in cases involving individual wrongdoing: Does the institu-
tion's structure encourage or discourage adherence to constitutional
standards of behavior? Does the institutional arrangement conceal
consequences or dilute responsibility in a way conducive to unconsti-
tutional behavior? One of the consequences of this change in attention
might be an expansion of what constitutes redressable harm. In the
constitutional context, the harms in question are often something
other than obvious physical injuries. 144 The terms of the Constitution,
read with an increased awareness of the ways in which governmental
power is felt by citizens, draw our attention to nonphysical harms:
emotional injuries, cumulative injuries inflicted by many small acts
over time, and the more tenuous economic injuries, such as decreased
opportunities for education or employment. 145 Injuries of this sort
may be attributed to institutional behavior only as courts become
more sophisticated in tracing its effects; they may be easy to see only
when courts stop searching for an identifiable individual
decisionmaker.
Thinking about institutions as institutions breaks the model of re-
ciprocal responsibility that is the basis of the common law. The lan-
guage of common-law tort presumes that each litigant is potentially
both plaintiff and defendant; the defendant is, at least theoretically,
held only to those standards that could also be fairly applied to the
plaintiff were their positions reversed. When the question of responsi-
bility is not defined in terms of the reciprocal obligations of potentially
equal individuals, it becomes possible for the plaintiff to ask that her
interests be taken into account by the defendant to an even greater
degree than has been required by the common law. She may also be-
lieve, and the judge may agree, that a government defendant can fairly
be required to be more responsive to broad community values in a way
that would be an inappropriate imposition on private or individual
conduct, for the government is charged to reflect the goals of society
as a whole rather than the narrower self-interest permitted private ac-
tors. 146 At most, the redefinition of responsibility may take the form
of a demand that the plaintiff be provided for, protected, maintained in
144. See, eg., Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247 (1978); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
145. See, eg., Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Antidis-
crimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8-12 (1976).
146. Of course, if society's goals are taken to be simply the achievement of efficiency, private
enterprises, rather than government institutions, may most closely reflect the public interest. See
Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for
Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1376-78 (1982).
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a certain state of security and well-being.147 At the least, it leads to a
demand for dignity - for fair consideration of one's concerns and in-
terests, as at common law, but with specific and visible guarantees to
assure the supplicant that the process is indeed fair; for freedom from
stigma or improper categorization; for freedom to exercise certain
rights, such as free speech or privacy. It goes too far to say that citi-
zens are owed absolute protection from harm, or a minimum guaran-
tee to the good life, from those who hold power, 148 but there are
injuries that may properly be the focus of litigation even though they
cannot be analyzed by traditional tort doctrine.
If the court were to break free, in constitutional litigation (and per-
haps in litigation against other sorts of institutions), from evaluating
the defendant's acts as if they were the product of an individual mind,
one consequence would be to bring to the fore the irrelevance of the
categories of intent, negligence, and even strict liability derived from
tort. 149 Nor should that other indicia of "mind" - a formal decision
- be required. The government, like other institutions, operates
through structures that direct and dispose of power. These can injure
grievously when deliberately used by individual human beings to do
harm. And they can injure just as seriously through inertia, direction
of energy to narrow goals, and oversight in the design of institutional
structures. It is in this sense that focus on institutional structures may
expand our sensitivity to previously disregarded harms. It may lead us
to be more appreciative of the positions of some defendants as well.
For example, when the defendant is in fact an individual, rather than
an institution, an awareness of institutional structure, and of the incen-
tive systems which that structure creates, may lead us to be more tol-
erant of the individual's oversight, lack of imagination, or failure to
take care.150
Even when the defendant is the government, or any institution of
147. See, e.g., Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977); Tribe, Unraveling National
League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services,
90 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1977).
148. Whitman, A "Humanitarian" Approach to Individual Injury, 79 MIcH. L. REv. 762,
765-67 (1981).
149. "Strict liability" is a term used to distinguish those theories of liability that do not
inquire into whether the defendant has acted reasonably or with negligence. It is useful, then, for
discussing whether negligence or some other theory should be used to determine liability in tort.
But negligence, to the extent that it embraces an obligation of empathy or mutual care, is not a
coherent way of talking about the exercise of institutional authority, and, therefore, the question
whether negligence or some other, strict liability theory should be used does not produce a useful
inquiry. See text at notes 120-22 supra. For the relevance of other, more explicitly economic
concepts of negligence, see text at notes 123-28 supra.
150. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 121, at 59-81.
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great power and complexity, it may not be fair to expect strict compli-
ance with the obligation (whether embodied in tort law or in constitu-
tional provisions) to consider the impact of one's activities on the
interests of others. The scope of potential victims may include all of
society, and the capacity of even a large and well-run institution to
take all the relevant interests into account has limits. Damages as the
price of failure may be too high. Yet, the price paid by the victim may
also be severe and one for which it is indeed appropriate to hold the
institution responsible. Moral evaluations of conduct, which are often
used to justify the imposition of liability on individual defendants,
need not be the sole basis of institutional obligation, particularly if the
remedy is an injunction to take care rather than an order to pay dam-
ages. 151 If this is what "responsibility" entails, it may have more to do
with an assessment of the severity of the plaintiff's injury, and the
conclusion that it may be avoided or reduced by the defendant, than
with any evaluation of the "morality" of the defendant's acts. The
point would be that there are certain harms that institutions should
not inflict, or should pay for, or should make special efforts to mini-
mize - rather than that a wrong decision has been made or wrongful
conduct undertaken.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE APPLIED
The very difficulty of formulating a vocabulary of responsibility
that is not derived from tort suggests that the courts might be wise to
avoid taking on the task of tracing the consequences of institutional
structures and processes. Yet in some cases it has seemed most natu-
ral to think of the institution as a whole in attributing responsibility
for harms. In these cases the Court's first instinct has been to frame
the question in terms that break away from tort, and only as an after-
thought has the language of tort exerted its pull. The cases do not
engage in the full analysis of structure and context suggested above,
but they do provide some indication that the Court's difficulties in ar-
ticulating a theory of institutional responsibility are due to habits of
language that can be overcome. One example can be found among the
"official policy and custom" cases. The more imaginative efforts to
think about these questions anew are found in cases involving due pro-
cess claims, and it is from one of these efforts that the Court has re-
treated most dramatically.
151. See Whitman, supra note 121, at 41-67.
[Vol. 85:225
HeinOnline  -- 85 Mich. L. Rev. 260 1986-1987
Constitutional Torts
A. Institutional Wrongs: Owen
Owen v. City of Independence 152 indicates that, at least when there
are explicit, decisive, and virtually contemporaneous actions by several
top decisionmakers, the Court will recognize that several branches of
the government, working together, can create a constitutional tort
even though the action of any single branch is not by itself unconstitu-
tional. Owen was an action brought against the city and several offi-
cials in their official capacity. The plaintiff was a former chief of police
who had been publicly charged by the city council with abuse of his
position and fired by the city manager on the following day. The case
was complicated by evidence that the manager had made the decision
to fire Owen before the council resolution and by the absence of any
stated grounds for the termination other than a reference to a city
charter provision that gave the manager sole authority to remove de-
partment heads. There was no indication that the city manager and
the council had jointly planned the sequence of events. The court of
appeals, applying Monell, held that the circumstances of the discharge
had inflicted an injury to Owen's reputation that "was caused by the
official conduct of the City's lawmakers ... [and] amounted to official
policy," depriving him of a protected liberty interest.1 53 There was no
cross-petition by the city challenging this conclusion that Owen had
been deprived of a "liberty" interest, so it was not properly before the
Court. But Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, took the time in
a footnote to state that "[w]e find no merit" in the city's contention
that there was no deprivation of a protected interest.154 The problem
was that no protected interest would have been impaired had the dis-
charge occurred without any damage to plaintiff's reputation, 155 and
damage to reputation alone also does not implicate any constitution-
ally protected interest. 156 In Owen's case, the manager performed the
discharge, while the council issued the allegedly defamatory state-
ments.157 Neither act, standing alone, amounted to a violation of the
Constitution. Justice Brennan, however, saw no barrier to recovery:
"[T]he city - through the unanimous resolution of the City Council
- released to the public an allegedly false statement impugning peti-
tioner's honesty and integrity. Petitioner was discharged the next
152. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
153. 589 F.2d 335, 337 (8th Cir. 1978).
154. 445 U.S. at 633 n.13.
155. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
156. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
157. The district court thought this dispositive. 421 F. Supp. 1110, 1121-22 (W.D. Mo.
1976).
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day. . . . [T]he defamatory and stigmatizing charges certainly 'oc-
cur[red] in the course of the termination of employment.' "158 The
Court, then, refused to divide the city of Independence into separate
decisionmakers (the council and the manager) and require that one of
these be found to have acted unconstitutionally. 159 It emphasized, in-
stead, the effect on the plaintiff of the city's actions, taken as a whole.
It was enough that Owen had suffered an injury that would clearly
implicate the Constitution had it been solely the result of either the
manager's or the council's actions. Yet, the Court still thought it sig-
nificant that both parts of the city government had issued overt and
explicit announcements that decisions had been made. Both the man-
ager's written notice discharging the plaintiff and the council's resolu-
tion fit easily with the language of purpose and decision devised in
Monell. 160 Under those circumstances the Court thought it fair to
hold the city accountable.1 61 (It may also have been important that
Owen could point to a subsequent decision that could be described as
the unconstitutional act of a single actor: after the discharge, at a time
when all were aware of the Council's actions, the city refused a de-
mand from Owen for leave to appeal the discharge decision. 62)
However, in addressing the question upon which certiorari had
been granted - a question of remedy, rather than of defining the
wrong - Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, moved away from
the analogy to individual responsibility that underlay Rizzo and Mo-
nell. Owen sought declaratory and injunctive relief, including a hear-
ing, backpay, and attorney's fees, but during the course of litigation he
reached the age of mandatory retirement, so his claim eventually re-
158. 445 U.S. at 633 n.13 (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976)).
159. Justice Powell took the opposite view in dissent. He thought that "[t]he notoriety that
attended Owen's firing resulted not from any city policy, but solely from public misapprehension
of the reasons for a purely discretionary dismissal." The fact that the misapprehension was also
caused by city action was irrelevant; indeed, Powell thought it was attributable, not to the city,
but to "the unauthorized statements of a lone councilman who had no direct role in the discharge
process.... There was [therefore] no constitutional injury .... 445 U.S. at 664.
160. Justice Brennan pointed out that the allegedly defamatory statements were released to
the public "through the unanimous resolution of the City Council." 445 U.S. at 633 n.13. In
Pembaur, Brennan erroneously described Owen as a case in which the "city council passed [a]
resolution firing plaintiff without a pretermination hearing." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106
S. Ct. 1292, 1298 (1986).
161. The questions of "official policy or custom" and whether there has been a constitutional
violation become intertwined here, as they often are, because both raise the issue of how broadly
the Court will look in tracing the causal connections between the defendant city and the plain-
tiff's injury. Justice Powell's response to Justice Brennan, see aote 159 supra, makes this most
obvious.
162. The Court in Owen does not stress this point and, indeed, conflates the refusal of this
request with the refusal of an earlier request by Owen, made prior to the council's actions. 445
U.S. at 633 n.13.
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duced to a suit for damages in lieu of backpay. 163 The question before
the Supreme Court was whether the city could claim a qualified immu-
nity of the sort available to an executive official in a damage action
when he or she is said to have deprived someone of a constitutional
right that was not clearly established at the time of the official's ac-
tions. 164 In Owen, the court of appeals had held, a qualified immunity
of this sort would relieve the city of liability, for the applicable consti-
tutional rule requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing 165 had
not been declared by the Supreme Court until ten weeks after the dis-
charge of plaintiff Owen.
As in Monell this question of immunity was regarded as turning on
the interpretation of section 1983:166 Had Congress, in enacting that
statute, intended to preserve or create a qualified immunity for munici-
pal corporations? The answer was no, the court concluded, because by
1871, the year of the statute's passage, corporations, including munici-
palities, "were treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of
constitutional and statutory analysis." 167 Justice Brennan found no
relevant functional protections of the sort that had been found to im-
munize individuals sued for misconduct committed while in office.
168
In this part of the opinion, the Court in Owen, as in Monell, built on a
presumed statutory conflation of institutional into individual liability,
but here, ironically, the ultimate effect is to expand municipal liability
beyond that imposed upon individuals.
But Brennan departed from the Monell analogy between institu-
tional and individual liability in his rejection of the argument that mu-
nicipal immunity, even if not available at common law in 1871, must
have been intended to have been incorporated into section 1983 be-
cause it is most compatible with the purposes of the statute. In this
discussion, which focused on the consequences of imposing a damage
remedy on a city, the Court accepted cost-allocation 169 and loss-
spreading arguments that had been implicitly rejected in Monell and
other decisions that addressed the scope of municipal liability. Once
the local government has been found to be "responsible" under the
test imposed by Monell, the Court concluded, it is fair to impose dam-
163. 445 U.S. at 632 n.12.
164. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
165. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
166. 445 U.S. at 635.
167. 445 U.S. at 639.
168. Justice Powell dissented on this point, powerfully challenging Justice Brennan's conclu-
sion that the nineteenth-century cases refusing to hold municipalities liable for governmental and
discretionary activities were not applicable to section 1983 liability. 445 U.S. at 676-79.
169. 445 U.S. at 655.
November 1986]
HeinOnline  -- 85 Mich. L. Rev. 263 1986-1987
Michigan Law Review
ages in order to serve cost-allocation principles of deterrence and loss
spreading.170 The justifications for such cost allocations are described
with explicit reference to the possibility of controlling the more amor-
phous harms that can be caused by institutional structures. The threat
of damage liability, Justice Brennan thought,
may encourage those in a policymaking position to institute internal
rules and programs designed to minimize the likelihood of unintentional
infringements on constitutional rights. Such procedures are particularly
beneficial in preventing those "systemic" injuries that result not so much
from the conduct of any single individual, but from the interactive be-
havior of several government officials, each of whom may be acting in
good faith.'
71
Perhaps, the Justice added, the threat of liability would "increase the
attentiveness with which officials at the higher levels of government
supervise the conduct of their subordinates."' 172
This seems quite unlike the caution inherent in the rationales of
Rizzo and Monell, and indeed, these goals simply cannot be achieved
given the Court's exclusion of most, perhaps all, systemic injuries from
the sphere of "official policy." Yet the Court in Owen went even fur-
ther: it concluded that it is fair to hold the government liable in dam-
ages simply as a matter of equitable loss spreading. 173 The
constitutional wrong becomes one of those "inevitable costs of govern-
ment [which should be] borne by all the taxpayers [rather than] ...
those whose rights ... have been violated." 174 It may seem callous to
talk about constitutional violations as an inevitable cost of government
business. But Justice Brennan was talking about a constitutional de-
velopment that, by hypothesis, "could not have been foreseen by mu-
nicipal officials."' 175 It is also significant that this was litigation against
the government as employer. It is easier to see the employment torts
of government as simply the costs of government business. In most
employment cases, in contrast to cases of, say, police or prison guard
misconduct, the financial interest of the government is obvious and
unremarkable, and the government seldom commits harms of that spe-
cial level of seriousness that cannot be duplicated by private individu-
als. 176 The Court was also, it is important to remember, careful to
170. See, eg., 445 U.S. at 655 n.39.
171. 445 U.S. at 652 (footnotes omitted); see also 445 U.S. at 656 (arguing that the threat of
municipal liability provides an incentive for municipal officials to act conscientiously).
172. 445 U.S. at 652 n.36.
173. 445 U.S. at 655, 657.
174. 445 U.S. at 655.
175. 445 U.S. at 655.
176. The Court, in its discussion of the nineteenth-century cases, noted that it was common-
place to sue cities for violations of contract, including contracts for employment under actions of
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stress that rationales of deterrence and loss spreading would be heard
only on the question of remedy. Loss spreading may have "joined
fault as a factor in distributing the costs of official misconduct," 177 but
"the public will be forced to bear only the costs of injury inflicted by
'the execution of a government's policy or custom' " within the terms
of Monell. 1
78
B. Due Process: Parratt and Logan
The Court has on other occasions found it easy, even natural, to
evaluate the impact of an institutional structure as a whole on an in-
jured individual. I shall describe two recent examples. One of them
was overruled when the Court belatedly realized that it was slipping
away from the individual wrongdoer model; the other is still sound
law. Like Owen, they are both cases claiming a violation of due pro-
cess: Parratt v. Taylor 179 and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.1 80
In Parratt and Logan, even more than in Owen, it is not easy to say
that there is an identifiable wrongdoer, or even an identifiable decision,
and the Court does not point to either. Parratt was brought by a pris-
oner, Taylor, whose hobby kit, ordered through the mail, was lost at
some point between its arrival at the prison and Taylor's release from
segregation. Taylor sued the warden and the prison hobby manager,
alleging that they had deprived him of his property without due pro-
cess of law and seeking damages that reflected the (relatively minor)
value of the lost kit.
Procedural due process cases like Parratt have frustrated the
courts because they look, on their facts, so much like ordinary com-
mon-law torts, yet a constitutional claim is clearly being made. It was
this sort of case that led some judges to conclude that negligent wrong-
doing was not sufficient, absent proof of wrongful intent, to support a
constitutional tort action. 181 In Parratt the Supreme Court realized
that requiring a showing of something more than negligence was the
wrong answer to the wrong question, that neither section 1983 nor any
wrongful discharge. 445 U.S. at 638-39 & n.19. Of course, it is critical to the finding that there
was a deprivation of liberty in this case that something more than a contract was at stake. The
wrongful discharge becomes of constitutional importance only because it is associated with an
injury to the employee's reputation. See text at note 155 supra. But see Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that in some instances an individual may have a
constitutionally protected property interest in continued public employment).
177. 445 U.S. at 657.
178. 445 U.S. at 657.
179. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
180. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
181. See text at note 19 supra.
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general principle of constitutional law made degree of culpability rele-
vant.1 8 2 The question whether something more than negligence might
be required only seemed relevant because of the false analogy to com-
mon-law tort with its inquiry into individualized wrongdoing. To fo-
cus on the distinction between intentional and negligent 183 acts was to
lift common-law language inappropriately into a constitutional case.
Taylor could prove nothing more than negligence on the part of
prison officials. Yet his claim that he had been deprived of his prop-
erty without constitutionally required process was not implausible, for
he had lost his property at the hands of people empowered by the
state, and neither a prior hearing nor prior notice had been pro-
vided. 184 The Court found, however, that Taylor had failed to state a
constitutional claim - not because he could only allege negligence,
but because postdeprivation remedies available through the state could
provide due process. Obviously, this holding gave the prisoner less
than he might have hoped; he had been seeking a postdeprivation rem-
edy in the federal court. Yet the Court in Parratt still had done some-
thing remarkable. Its reasoning broke away from the common-law
model - which defines the wrongdoer and the wronged narrowly -
and evaluated whether a constitutional wrong had occurred by looking
at the operation of the system as a whole. One branch of the state
deprived Taylor of his hobby kit; another could provide the necessary
hearing and, if appropriate, compensation.
Taylor might have expected a federal damage remedy because he
was looking at his injury through the common-law model: he had
been deprived of his property by the prison employees who lost the
hobby kit, and he thought that he should have an action against them.
182. 451 U.S. at 554-55 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Note that negligent acts might be either inadvertent or deliberate. See Davidson v.
Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668, 673 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d
381 (7th Cir. 1979), cited by Justice Blackmun, 106 S. Ct. at 674 n.3, illustrates this point: The
allegations in that case were that police officers, upon arresting the driver of a car, refused to
provide assistance to three minor children, including a five-year-old asthmatic, accompanying
him. The children were left in the abandoned car at night on a busy limited-access highway.
Although the case involved police decisions and action that was not inadvertent, it would most
likely be analyzed at common law in terms of negligence rather than intentional tort. The com-
mon-law distinction between intent and negligence hinges on the existence of a quite specific kind
of intent - for example, in battery, the intent to have a harmful or offensive contact with an-
other person. (Here a case might be made out in false imprisonment, which requires proof of
intent to confine or, perhaps, to commit some other trespass to the person.) Where no such
intent has been established, no intentional tort can be made out even if a decision (for example, a
decision to leave a car parked on a very steep slope) has been made. But the case can still be
analyzed in terms of negligence - or, perhaps, strict liability.
184. Taylor could point to no decision to take his property. 451 U.S. at 543. If there had
been such a decision, even with notice and opportunity for a hearing, the taking would have been
intentional.
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Section 1983, if it were read to authorize an award of damages
equivalent to the lost kit, could provide that action. Under that ap-
proach, however, the overlap between constitutional and common law
would be too great. The Court adopted a broader perspective. It de-
fined a wrong without a specifiable wrongdoer: any constitutional in-
jury that might exist would be that inflicted by the state system as a
whole where it failed to provide due process, and not by the individual
employees who had allegedly lost the hobby kit. 185 Under the circum-
stances, this analysis made considerable sense, for where the loss is not
deliberate the actors responsible for the deprivation have made no de-
cision of the sort that a prior hearing could inform. But the fact that a
loss is not deliberate does not mean that no predeprivation steps are
available to government actors. Where the risk of loss is foreseeable
and sufficiently high, due process may be said to require that steps be
taken to minimize that risk. 186 Though the loss of the property in a
situation like Parratt 1 8 7 is not intended, the failure to provide these
safeguards might itself be either deliberate or inadvertent, depending
on whether the risk had been explicitly focused upon in the design of
the institutional structure. The Court in Parratt did not address that
question, perhaps because it assumed that "process" referred to the
sort of safeguards, such as hearings, that might surround individuated
185. The separate opinions of Justice Blackmun, concurring, and Justice Marshall, concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part, suggest alternative approaches that would also require the
Court to consider the institutional procedures as a whole, rather than simply the act that caused
the loss. Justice Blackmun asserted: "When it is possible for a State to institute procedures to
contain and direct the intentional actions of its officials, it should be required, as a matter of due
process, to do so." 451 U.S. at 546. Justice Marshall was concerned that the state had not
alleged that it had informed Taylor of his right to sue under state tort law: "In cases such as this,
I believe prison officials have an affirmative obligation to inform a prisoner who claims that he is
aggrieved by official action about the remedies available under state law." 451 U.S. at 556.
186. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct.
668, 673 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In some circumstances, the risk of injury is so
high that the government's failure to make efforts to avoid the injury is unacceptable, even if its
omission still might be categorized as negligence."); see also Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
153-54 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[P]olice officers must conform to procedures mandated
by the Constitution which serve to minimize the risk of wrongful and unjustified deprivations of
personal liberty.").
187. Three years after Parratt, the Court decided Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), in
which it applied the Parratt analysis to a case in which the plaintiff had alleged that a prison
guard had intentionally deprived him of noncontraband personal property. The Court described
the reasoning of Parratt as follows: "that where a loss of property is occasioned by a random,
unauthorized act by a state employee, rather than by an established state procedure, the state
cannot predict when the loss will occur... [and] predeprivation procedures are simply 'impracti-
cable.'" 468 U.S. at 532-33. This reading of Parratt, in a suit brought only against the prison
guard who was alleged to have taken the property, is oddly reminiscent of the "official policy and
custom" cases, which also emphasize the existence of authority for official conduct. The question
becomes: What could the state have done differently? And the answer given is: "Nothing, when
the action of the guard was unauthorized." No inquiry is made into whether the state en-
couraged, tolerated, or facilitated the intentional conduct of its employee.
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decisions made in particular cases. It thought, therefore, only of what
could be done for Taylor, and after-the-fact compensation seemed
enough.
The Court did not say who could be sued if there were no
postdeprivation procedures and their absence was found to violate the
constitutional guarantees of due process. There was a suggestion that
it might then be appropriate to sue the prison employees for the price
of the lost property.188 That is, one way to redress a lack in the state
remedial structure would be to provide an alternative damage remedy
in federal court. This approach would not only raise the problem of
overlap with tort described above, but would also provide, at best, a
partial, temporary, solution. The prison employees who lost the kit
were not in a position to remedy the constitutional lack of due process.
They were unlikely to have either the power to create a postdepriva-
tion remedy or the power to bring about changes in institutional
processes that would minimize the risk of loss. Again, no single person
or body in a Parratt situation is responsible for the harm. The injury is
caused by the way in which the different parts of the system fit to-
gether. One arm of the state brings about the deprivation and another
fails to provide the process required by law. An alternative remedy,
one that would be more consistent with the theory of the case, would
be to grant declaratory or injunctive relief against the state prison offi-
cials, requiring that adequate process be provided. This would avoid
the unfairness of holding individual officials liable in federal court for
a wrong attributable to the structure of the system. 189 It would also
respond to Justice Powell's concern, in his concurrence, that the real
wrongdoers under the Parratt theory are the state or its lawmakers,
both of whom are immune from damage liability.190
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.' 91 is also a due process case,
188. The ground for reversal in Parratt itself was that due process is sufficiently provided
where "[there is no contention that the procedures themselves are inadequate," 451 U.S. at 543,
leaving the negative implication that a different result would be appropriate where such a conten-
tion is made. A suit for damages against the state itself would be barred by the eleventh amend-
ment, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), and damage actions against the legislators and
judges who design and articulate state compensatory remedies would be barred by doctrines of
official immunity. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 732-35 (1980);
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
189. See Whitman, supra note 121, at 57, 60-62.
190. 451 U.S. at 550 n.8. The plaintiff could proceed against state officials for injunctive
relief under Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), but would be barred by the eleventh amend-
ment from recovering retrospective relief such as damages. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974). The eleventh amendment does not provide similar protection for local governments,
although, of course, the plaintiff in suits against these entities must establish "official policy or
custom." Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
191. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
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though it stands on the border between procedure and substance. It
was not an action brought under section 1983, but an appeal from a
state supreme court decision in favor of a private employer in a case
brought under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act. Appellant
Logan had ified a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Fair Em-
ployment Practices Commission. Although the state statute required
the commission to convene a factfinding conference within 120 days of
the bringing of the charge, the conference on Logan's complaint was
scheduled by the commission for five days after the expiration of the
statutory period. The untimely scheduling of the conference was ap-
parently inadvertent and, of course, completely beyond Logan's con-
trol. However, at the employer's petition the state supreme court held
that this failure to comply with the statutory time limit deprived the
commission of jurisdiction and extinguished Logan's claim.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that a state
"may not finally destroy a property interest [here, Logan's right to use
the commission procedures] without first giving the putative owner an
opportunity to present his claim of entitlement."' 192 Again, it was only
because of the combined effect of actions by several different arms of
the state that a constitutional wrong had been done. The Court did
not say that the commission had acted unconstitutionally in schedul-
ing the factfinding conference beyond the 120-day period; in fact, the
commission had denied the employer's request to dismiss Logan's
complaint. What was unconstitutional was to give the commission's
error the significance it was given by the Illinois Supreme Court, to
make it the grounds for destroying Logan's claim. The United States
Supreme Court found constitutional error by looking at the way in
which the claim-processing system worked as a whole. It asked
whether the state structure was consistent with constitutional require-
ments of fair procedure. The case stands at the border between sub-
stantive and procedural due process 193 because the Court did not ask
whether the decision to deprive Logan of his claim - a decision that
can be said to have been made either by the state legislature in impos-
ing the 120-day limit or by the state supreme court in enforcing that
limit in this way - was made with fair procedures, but whether that
decision could be reached at all.
In both Parratt and Logan the Court was properly sensitive to the
192. 455 U.S. at 434.
193. The majority, however, characterized the case only as one involving procedural due
process. 455 U.S. at 433-38. A separate opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the author of the
majority opinion, and joined by three other Justices, also found the Illinois scheme to violate
Logan's right to equal protection. 455 U.S. at 438-42. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehn-
quist, concurred in the judgment solely on equal protection grounds. 455 U.S. at 443-44.
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design of a state system in its handling of citizen concerns, and to the
possibility that structural design may create constitutional questions
through either deliberate omissions or inadvertence. (It is possible,
even probable, that the Illinois legislature in prescribing the 120-day
limit never asked what sanctions would be imposed if the commission
failed to act within that time period.) What the Court seemed to re-
quire of the system was not anything remarkable, but simply that fair
weight be given to the interests of those whom the institution affects.
This is a requirement that is reminiscent of the commands of common-
law torts. But it takes special form when there is no single act or
single actor. And, of course, when government conduct is at stake, the
standards to be met are found in the particular requirements of the
Constitution. When the defendant is no longer an individual like the
plaintiff, nor private and thus presumably motivated by self-interest,
greater claims may appropriately be made.
Although Logan and Parratt addressed the constitutional question
whether due process had been complied with, rather than the statutory
issue raised by suits against government defendants, the language used
to attribute responsibility to government has influenced the discussion
of these constitutional matters too. Both Logan and Parratt appropri-
ately looked to the impact of the government's actions as a whole on
the federal plaintiff, rather than engaging in a search for an individual
or individuals whose culpability could be measured by standards fa-
miliar from tort. But the Court has not been able to maintain this
direction without hesitation. When it found that applying Parratt
would require it to address new questions in new ways, it retreated
abruptly to the more familiar emphasis on state-of-mind and negli-
gence-versus-intent borrowed from tort. The retreat came last Term
in two prison cases, Daniels v. Williams 1 94 and Davidson v. Cannon. 195
Neither action was a suit against a government entity defendant.
Daniels, who had been a prisoner in a Richmond, Virginia, jail, sued a
deputy who had negligently left newspapers and a pillow on a prison
stairway. Daniels slipped on these materials, fell, suffered back and
ankle injuries, and alleged in his section 1983 action that the state rem-
edy for his injuries was inadequate. 196 Davidson, while incarcerated in
a New Jersey state prison, was attacked by another prisoner, who
194. 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
195. 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986).
196. The Virginia Tort Claims Act applied only to actions accruing on or after July 1, 1982;
Daniels was injured before that date. The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the dismissal of Daniels'
claim by the federal district court, apparently concluded that the deputy's sovereign immunity
defense would fail under state law. Daniels v. Williams, 748 F.2d 229, 232 & n.5 (4th Cir. 1984).
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stabbed him with a fork about his face and body. Davidson's section
1983 action was brought against prison officials who had failed to re-
spond to a note in which he reported a threat that preceded the attack
and, at least implicitly, requested protection. New Jersey, by statute,
provided that: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable
for.., any injury caused by... a prisoner to any other prisoner."
197
Both plaintiffs argued that the inadequacy of the state postdeprivation
remedies violated due process under Parratt. The Supreme Court, in
opinions by Justice Rehnquist, held that neither plaintiff had made out
a constitutional case.
As in earlier opinions, Justice Rehnquist described the problem
before the Court as "determining when tortious conduct by state offi-
cials rises to the level of a constitutional tort." 198 He held that Parratt
was in error insofar as it had concluded that an unintended loss caused
by the negligent conduct of government officials could be a "depriva-
tion" implicating the due process clause. If the plaintiff could prove
no intent to deprive him of his property or to injure him physically,
there was no "deprivation" of an interest and therefore no need to
reach the question of what process was due. Once more, individual
culpability - the ascertainment of a particular state of mind held by a
government official or officials - was made an essential inquiry in
establishing a constitutional claim. Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in
Daniels 199 was sparse at best. It consisted primarily of the announce-
ment that the Court had been persuaded to adopt a concurrence writ-
ten by Justice Powell in Parratt, along with brief quotations from that
opinion and from Justice Stewart's concurrence in the same case. This
is the heart of the Daniels opinion:
Not only does the word "deprive" in the Due Process Clause connote
more than a negligent act, but we should not "open the federal courts to
lawsuits where there has been no affimative abuse of power." [Parratt,
451 U.S.] at 548-549 [Powell, J., concurring in the result]; see also id., at
545 ... (Stewart J., concurring) ("To hold that this kind of loss is a
deprivation of property within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment seems not only to trivialize, but grossly to distort the meaning and
intent of the Constitution"). Upon reflection, we agree and overrule Par-
ratt .... 200
The key to what rises to the level of a constitutional violation was
described, appropriately enough, as the "affirmative abuse of power."
The assumption in Daniels, however, was that power can be abused
197. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b)(4) (West 1982).
198. 106 S. Ct. at 664.
199. Davidson simply applied the Daniels rule in an even briefer opinion.
200. 106 S. Ct. at 664-65.
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only through those particular acts that would also meet the require-
ments of the more egregious common-law torts. The claims made in
Daniels and Davidson, Justice Rehnquist thought, would require that
the Constitution "supplant traditional tort law in laying down rules of
conduct to regulate liability for injuries that attend living together in
society. ' 20 1 The post-Parratt cases involving intentional acts by gov-
ernment officials202 were described as involving "quite different"
claims.20 3 The distinction seems to be between negligence and inten-
tional torts.
2°4
But neither Daniels nor Davidson had suffered ordinary injuries of
the sort that private individuals inflict upon each other in the course of
living together. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, Da-
vidson had been "stripped [by the state] of all means of self protec-
tion" 20 5 and forced to live among very dangerous people. And, as
Parratt accurately recognized, both Davidson and Daniels, unlike in-
dividuals injured by other individuals, had been deprived by the state
of a remedy for compensation. Daniels' fall could have happened on
any stairway - a point that eight Justices stress - but this stairway,
unlike most others, was owned by an entity that could give itself spe-
cial protection against suit. To provide that special protection may
not be an abuse of power,20 6 but it is certainly an exercise of power
that raises questions not reached by common-law tort.
The holding of Daniels and Davidson applies to all claims brought
under the due process clause, for the requirements of that constitu-
tional provision, be they substantive or procedural, apply only when
the plaintiff has suffered a "deprivation. '20 7 But the Court's emphasis
on deliberateness and intent makes most sense as a narrow reading of
those situations in which procedural safeguards are due. Read this
201. 106 S. Ct. at 666. Rehnquist continued by quoting the concern he expressed in Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976), that the fourteenth amendment not be made "a font of tort law
to be superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the States."
202. E.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1033 (1973).
203. Davidson, 106 S. Ct. at 670.
204. Justice Brennan, who joined the majority in Daniels, Justice Marshall, who concurred in
the result, and Justice Blackmun, who concurred in the judgment, all dissented in Davidson on
the ground that the officials' conduct in that case was sufficiently serious to be described as
exhibiting recklessness or deliberate indifference, rather than being "merely negligent." 106 S.
Ct. at 671, 675.
205. 106 S. Ct, at 671.
206. See Justice Stevens' opinion concurring in the judgments, 106 S. Ct. at 677 (discussed in
text at note 217 infra).
207. Justice Rehnquist cited substantive due process cases, such as Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952), as well as procedural due process cases, as support for his narrow definition of
"deprivation." See 106 S. Ct. at 665.
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way, Daniels and Davidson could be said implicitly to define proce-
dural due process protections as necessary only when government
"agents decide to 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,' "208
on the basis of facts that might be misperceived. If the only constitu-
tionally required procedures are those designed to minimize factual
error in government decisionmaking, it is plausible to insist on some
showing that a decision has been made. The required procedures need
not be adversarial. (They could, as was argued in Baker v. McCol-
lan, 20 9 consist of checking files to ascertain the true identity of a pris-
oner who protests that he is not the man wanted by the police.) And
they could, perhaps, be provided after the fact.210 If a decision has
been made and proper procedures have been followed, there should be
no liability for error.21
1
But Daniels and Davidson were not written as procedural due pro-
cess cases. And, if the question of constitutional interpretation turns
on the word "deprivation," rather than on what process is due, the
quality of the loss to the plaintiff is at least as important as the wrong-
fulness of any official's conduct. 212 If the cases were intended to ad-
dress questions beyond the procedural safeguards necessary in the
making of fact-based decisions, and the effect of government action on
the plaintiff is to be weighed, it is not so easy to see why questions of
abuse of power are not raised when the government fails to take steps
to minimize inadvertent loss or provides itself with a unique immunity
from suits for compensation. Government practices and institutional
structures can create special and impermissible harms whether they
are the result of deliberate decisions or inadvertence.
208. Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665.
209. 443 U.S. 137, 143 (1979).
210. The survival of Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), which applied Parratt in finding
postdeprivation state remedies sufficient to satisfy due process when a prison guard is alleged to
have stolen a prisoner's property, could be justified on this ground. The state might fairly be
asked to take steps to minimize official wrongdoing of this sort and to provide compensation after
the loss, but, if all that is necessary in that regard has been done, it is absurd to argue that prior
procedures be followed to ensure the correctness of a decision (the guard's decision to steal) that
all, including the decisionmaker, would concede is inappropriate or even illegal.
211. For example, in Davidson, as Justice Blackmun pointed out, government officials made
at least two decisions. Two of the defendants, the assistant superintendent of the prison and a
corrections sergeant, decided, at separate times, not to take prompt action on being notified of
the threat. 106 S. Ct. at 672, 675. These decisions may have been unreasonable, and thus negli-
gent, but they were made intentionally. (Unintentional negligence came into play later, when the
sergeant left the prison having forgotten Davidson's note. 106 S. Ct. at 672.) Yet, these are not
the sort of government decisions that would normally require a prior hearing. Nor was any
allegation made that a change in institutional processes would have reduced the risk of error. An
error in result does not in itself indicate abuse of government power.
212. As Justice Stevens said, in his opinion concurring in the judgments, "'Deprivation,' it
seems to me, identifies, not the actor's state of mind, but the victim's infringement or loss." 106
S. Ct. at 680.
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The Court dismissed the claims brought in Daniels and Davidson
because the front-line officials - the deputy who left the pillow on the
stairs and the correctional officials who failed to respond to David-
son's request for protection - had made no deliberate decision to in-
jure the plaintiffs. But deliberate decisions were in fact at issue in both
cases, for the basic challenge of each plaintiff was to the state's refusal
to provide compensatory relief. A state's decision to invoke sovereign
immunity2 13 raises a question that, even under the Court's analysis,
should be asked: Is the decision to deny a remedy under the circum-
stances an "arbitrary exercise of the powers of government" 2 14 or gov-
ernmental power "used for purposes of oppression"? 215 Justice
Rehnquist overlooked these decisions - including the embodiment of
New Jersey's choice in that most "official" of forms, a statute - be-
cause he saw these as tort cases between the individuals who had suf-
fered loss and the government agents who had dealt with them
directly.2
16
To ask whether the invocation of sovereign immunity is an abuse
of governmental power is not to answer that question in the affirma-
tive. It is far from unreasonable, for instance, for government to pro-
vide protection for its agents, coupled with mechanisms for internal
discipline and the possibility of compensation from public resources.
Even a flat protection in certain cases, such as prisoner suits, may be
found to be not unfair. Indeed, that was Justice Stevens' conclusion in
Davidson, where he asked the question posed above and concluded
that there was no violation of the Constitution. 21 7
If the Court could have preserved the analysis of Parratt and still
213. In Daniels, immunity was raised by the defendant, though the court of appeals thought
that it would not in fact be available under Virginia law. 748 F.2d at 232 & n.5. There was a
clear legislative decision to make the Tort Claims Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.1 (1984),
apply only to claims accruing on or after July 1982. In Davidson, a legislative decision to provide
immunity to both the state and its officials was embodied in the statute. 106 S. Ct. at 670 (quot-
ing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2(b)(4) (West 1982)).
214. 106 S. Ct. at 665 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1884)).
215. 106 S. Ct. at 665 (quoting Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1856)).
216. See Justice Rehnquist's description of Daniels and Parratt as involving "the actions of
prison custodians in leaving a pillow on the prison stairs, [and] mislaying an inmate's property,"
Daniels, 106 S. Ct. at 665, as well as his distinction of Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
as implicating due process because it involved a "deliberate decision to deprive [a specific] inmate
of good-time credit." 106 S. Ct. at 666.
Justice Rehnquist could have been encouraged to characterize these cases in this way by the
fact that these front-line officials were the defendants named by the plaintiffs. But that litigation
choice was the one to which plaintiffs were, perhaps erroneously, directed by Parratt. See text at
notes 188-90 supra.
217. 106 S. Ct. at 681. Justice Stevens' concurrence in Daniels is based upon his deference to
the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that Virginia law would not have defeated the prisoner's claim.
106 S. Ct. at 680.
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defeated plaintiff's claim, why did it so forcefully back away from that
case? The Justices may have feared that they were about to venture
into an area where the temptation to ask too much of government
would be very strong.218 But that temptation could have been ad-
dressed directly, as it was in Justice Stevens' concurrence. Instead, the
Court's shift in direction seems to reflect the view, expressed most
forcefully in Rizzo v. Goode,219 that constitutional litigation is not ap-
propriately used to address questions of institutional structures and
practices. In this view, constitutional litigation, by analogy to tort,
redresses only those injuries caused by aberrant individual defendants
who have violated social norms for personal behavior. Yet, from Paul
v. Davis, 220 in which Justice Rehnquist first expressed his concern that
constitutional litigation not be "a font of tort law," through Daniels
and Davidson, which are the most recent expression of that preoccupa-
tion, the Court has also sought to distinguish constitutional cases from
tort. It has sought to do so by defining constitutional cases as falling
into some particularly egregious subcategory of torts, rather than by
taking the opportunity to develop a vocabulary, truly independent
from tort, that could be used to discuss the special problems created
by the massing of power in institutions. In due process cases, as in
litigation involving municipal liability, the Court has assumed that
those cases sufficiently serious to merit constitutional attention are the
cases that parallel "the most serious" 221 torts, where the plaintiff can
point to a deliberate decision to act wrongfully. Yet, by the Court's
own description, the special character of the Constitution is that it
directly addresses questions of structure and the abuse of power.
Focusing on structures and processes as mechanisms for the abuse
of power may indeed lead the courts to questions that they have not
faced before. Many of these questions will be difficult. But it will be
even more difficult to maintain the fiction that all questions of respon-
sibility for harm can be answered by reference to norms developed for
individual behavior. The effort to maintain that fiction leads only to
such futile doctrinal developments as the attempt to find a governmen-
218. See text at notes 144-48 supra.
219. 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976).
220. 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976).
221. Intentional torts might seem most serious because some of the conduct that they reach
may also be subject to criminal sanctions, and some torts, such as trespass, share the origins of
similarly named criminal actions. Also, punitive damages, which are unavailable for simple neg-
ligence, see, eg., Spackman v. Ralph M. Parsons Co., 147 Mont. 500, 414 P.2d 918 (1966), may
be available for intentional torts accompanied by circumstances of aggravation or outrage. Bir-
mingham Waterworks Co. v. Brooks, 16 Ala. App. 209, 76 So. 515 (1916); Chiles v. Drake, 59
Ky. (2 Mete.) 146 (1859). But see text at notes 115-18 supra (state of mind required to establish
intentional tort is not necessarily indicative of evil motive).
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tal "mind" or the refusal to recognize that a loss can be felt as keenly
when it comes about through the negligent misuse of state power as
when it comes about through intentional abuse. Legitimacy depends at
least as much upon credibility as upon caution in asking new
questions.
If a vocabulary for resolving questions of institutional responsibil-
ity were developed in constitutional litigation, it might, of course,
prove useful in tort. Once we see how injuries can be caused by insti-
tutions in ways not analogous to harm caused by individuals, claims
similar to those brought in litigation against the government might be
raised against other powerful institutions. For example: The "due
process" demand for access, for consideration, might as easily be made
upon private but powerful institutions, and it could be vindicated,
where appropriate, as a common-law tort. Or tort might address insti-
tutional practices that intensify the impact of racist or sexist biases.
Tort law might focus more deliberately, not on actual or hypothetical
individual behavior, but on whether practices or structures have con-
tributed significantly to the creation of undesirable consequences.
A shift of focus beyond questions of individual wrongdoing is im-
portant. Our struggle with the consequences of racism and sexism has
made us aware that injuries do not flow solely from the acts of evil or
careless persons. And we have begun to be open to the possibility that
characteristics attributed to women or minorities, as a class or as indi-
viduals, may be the consequence of social structures and expectations.
Neither torts nor constitutional law can ensure individual fulfillment.
Relief from abuse of power is important in furthering individual lib-
erty, but so is a sense of responsibility for one's own life and the exist-
ence of groups that can be a source of strength and fellowship. The
law cannot give us all jobs in a depressed economy. It does not help us
to resist the temptations of flattery. It offers no relief from the casual
cruelties of friends and strangers. But a law that addresses only the
* isolated behavior of individuals, whether private or official, sees only
some of the ways in which power can be abused, and the abuse of
power is a subject -with which the law is properly concerned.
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